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Abstract
In 2010, the 111th Congress passed the first national health care reform in the
United States, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). This landmark
legislation is intended to “fix” a health care system renowned for decreasing access and
escalating costs. This paper examines one of the principal reforms in the ACA, the state
health insurance exchanges. The author finds theoretical and empirical evidence to
support the exchanges’ potential (in conjunction with other relevant ACA reforms) to
increase access, decrease insurers’ excess profits and shift health care costs away from
those least able to afford them. The exchanges fall short of becoming a panacea,
however, as they leave a large number of people uninsured, even in optimal scenarios.
Thus, the exchanges are essentially another band-aid for the system which covers
additional people, yet does not cure the U.S. health care system’s ills.
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INTRODUCTION
As the first national health care reform to become law, expectations and criticisms
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) abound. This paper
will attempt to address expectations and criticism of a central part of the reform, the state
health benefit exchanges. The exchanges are intended to improve access to health
insurance and health care and are part of the cost-containment mechanisms in the ACA.
Due to the complexity of the ACA and the health care system in the U.S., this paper will
focus mainly on health insurance markets and the health insurance exchanges. Related
areas, such as insurer-provider and provider-consumer interactions will be referenced
indirectly as necessary to examine the health insurance market. To fully understand the
functions of health insurance exchanges, the major ACA reforms affecting the exchanges
will also be examined.
The first chapter of this paper, Historical Background, will provide a brief history
of health care in the U.S. and introduce the concepts of the individual mandate and the
health insurance exchange. The history of U.S. health care describes how the existing
U.S. health care system was formed over time by policies reacting to the changing
economic, political and social environment, rather than an overarching view of health
care. This illustrates how health care in the U.S. evolved into a complex and
disorganized system that excludes a portion of the population from obtaining affordable
health insurance (and health care) as costs continue to rise. The following sections
1

describe the origins of the ideas of the health insurance exchange and the individual
mandate, two of the central features of the ACA examined in this paper. The chapter
concludes with an overview of the health care reform in the U.S. since the beginning of
the 20th century, including recent proposals that include health insurance exchanges and
the individual mandate. This section emphasizes the incrementalist approach that the
U.S. has historically employed when attempting to reform the health care system. This
section complements the earlier section on the history of the U.S. health care as it
describes the reform efforts that occurred in response to, and because of, the conditions
existing during different time periods.
In the second chapter, the economics behind the health care exchanges is
discussed, and applied to the exchanges outlined in the ACA. First, the economic theory
is applied to health insurance markets to explain why the current system fails to achieve
certain outcomes, and how health insurance exchanges could correct these failures. Next,
the main provisions in the ACA that affect the insurance exchanges, as well as
regulations for the exchanges themselves are explained. Special emphasis is placed on
the flexibility given to states in designing their exchanges. Finally, economic theory is
applied to the health care exchanges in the ACA to make general predictions about the
effects of various design choices.
The third chapter will explore existing models of the outcomes of the ACA in the
U.S. that are based on economic theory. These models simulate the responses of
individuals and businesses to different ACA regulations and exchange designs. Although
the results of these models vary and must be interpreted with caution, their results are
generally similar and in line with the economic theory described in the previous chapter.
2

These models will be used to discuss the potential results of implementing the current
ACA reform, eliminating the individual mandate from the ACA, and the more radical
approach of creating a single payer system. All of these scenarios represent currently
possible implementations of the reform. The following section describes states’ progress
in establishing exchanges and their design choices as of the writing of this paper. This
chapter will conclude with a closer examination of Colorado’s health insurance exchange,
including a simulation modified for Colorado-specific conditions. Finally, the author will
answer the question in the title of this paper to conclude whether health insurance
exchanges are a panacea or merely a band-aid.
Throughout this paper, the terms “health insurance exchange,” “health benefits
exchange” and simply “exchange” are used interchangeably. Health insurance
companies are referred to as “health insurers,” “insurers,” or “insurance carriers.” Health
plans offered by health insurance companies are referred to as “health plans” or simply
“plans.”

3

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A Brief History of the U.S. Health Care System
The current U.S. health care system evolved from a series of historical events and
political decisions over the last century. These were mostly the product of beliefs and
circumstances particular to their time, rather than an overarching vision of health care,
which has resulted in the complex and somewhat unmanageable system that exists today.

The Precursors to Modern Health Insurance: Early 20th Century
As the Industrial Revolution shifted work from rural farms to urban factories, the
population also shifted towards the cities. This shift left the newly urbanized population
exposed to the occupational hazards of factory life at a time when they were separated
from the extended family networks which had previously provided them with support
during times of need. During this time period, physicians usually visited patients at home
and, given the still rudimentary state of medical technology, there was little they could do
for many illnesses. As a result, medical expenditures were generally very low, and the
amount lost in wages due to an accident or illness was often much greater than the cost of
treatment. Thus, by the end of the 19th century, many workers obtained some type of
accident, sickness or burial insurance that was offered by fraternal organizations, labor
unions and private insurers (Austin and Hungerford 2009, 2). These insurance policies
4

were mostly indemnity plans which would distribute a predetermined amount of cash in
the event of a serious illness or accident.
Although most insurance at the time protected against economic losses due to
accidents, the first plans to actually cover medical services began to emerge, albeit slowly
and in a very limited scope in the lumber, mining and railroad industries. The Western
Clinic in Tacoma, Washington, is credited with being the first plan to cover medical
services during the 1870s and 1880s. The plan paid doctors a fixed monthly fee to
provide members with needed medical services. The very first group health insurance
policy was created shortly thereafter, in 1910, and it offered employees of Montgomery
Ward and Company an indemnity plan insuring against wages lost as a result of sickness
or injury (Scofea 1994, 3).

The Beginning of Modern Health Insurance: The Great Depression and the Blues
Modern health insurance on a large scale was originally conceived as insurance to
cover hospitals and providers against unpaid bills. In 1929, an executive of the Baylor
University Hospital in Dallas, Texas noticed a large number of unpaid bills accumulated
by local teachers. To relieve this burden from the hospital (and the teachers) the Baylor
University Hospital created an insurance plan providing certain hospital services as
needed to teachers who paid a monthly premium of $6 (Melissa Thomasson 2010). As
the Great Depression continued, the problem of unpaid hospital bills became even more
pervasive as an increasing number of people were unable to pay for their hospital care.
According to Laura A. Scofea of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, “more than 100 hospitals
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nationwide had failed in the first years of the Depression and those that remained in
business had only about a 50-percent occupancy rate” (Scofea 1994, 3).
Hospitals began offering insurance plans similar to the Baylor plan to stabilize
their revenues. The American Hospital Association began creating Blue Cross plans,
which allowed members access to most, if not all hospitals within a city. By 1939, 25
states had passed legislation enabling hospital insurance plans, many of which designated
Blue Cross plans as charities and exempted them from various insurance regulations and
taxes (Starr 1983, 298). Soon after, similar plans, called Blue Shield plans, were
developed for physician services. As charitable community organizations, Blue
Cross/Blue Shield plans (the Blues) typically used a community rating to determine
premiums (as opposed to experience rating often used today). Under this arrangement all
covered individuals within a plan pay the same amount, so those with the lowest health
care costs subsidize those with higher health care costs.
At the same time, the first Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) were being
developed on the West Coast. These provided a wider range of medical services to
members from specific providers for a predetermined rate. The first of these was created
in 1929 by two physicians, Donald Ross and H. Clifford Loos, who agreed to provide
medical care for employees of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power for a
prepaid monthly fee. An HMO which would become one of the largest and most widely
known in the country, Kaiser Permanente, was also formed during the 1930’s (Scofea
1994, 5). As the Blues proliferated and the first HMOs were being organized, the
influential American Hospital Association (AHA) and American Medical Association
(AMA) worked to stifle competition between providers and insurance plans which they
6

argued would threaten the financial stability of the health care industry. This was the
beginning of what Bodenheimer and Grumbach call the “provider-insurer pact” which
dominated the health care industry until the 1970s. (Bodenheimer and Grumbach 2008,
194)

Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance and Public Programs: WWII to 1960s
By 1940, 10% of the population of the United States was covered by some form
of health insurance (Scofea, 1994, 6). As World War II progressed, and available
domestic labor decreased, businesses which could no longer compete by increasing
wages due to war-time controls began offering health insurance as a benefit to attract
employees; this was even beneficial to employers as the Internal Revenue Service
considered health insurance premiums paid by employers as necessary business expenses
rather than taxable income received by the employee (codified in Section 106 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1945). Employer-offered or employer-sponsored insurance
continued to grow during the post-war prosperity enjoyed by U.S. business which
encountered strong demand for their products and weak competition from abroad.
Unions, which were also gaining strength, were able to extract generous benefits,
including health insurance, from employers. During this time, the provider-insurer pact
assured the success of the Blues which dominated an uncompetitive and rapidly growing
insurance market. The Blues, and eventually, new commercial health insurers, accepted
generous reimbursement rules set by providers who were members of the AHA and
AMA. Health care costs were driven up as hospitals invested in the newest and most
expensive technologies and a greater number of physicians moved away from primary
7

care towards more profitable specialized medicine. The cost of hospital care, for
example, doubled during the 1950s (Healthcare Timeline). Providers and insurers were
able to pass these costs on to businesses and consumers because of the prosperous
economy and the preferred tax treatment of employer contributions towards health
insurance. According to National Health Expenditure Accounts data compiled by the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, national health expenditures reached 5.2%
of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 1960. (National Health Expenditure Accounts)
The Blues’ success convinced commercial insurers to enter the market. By the
end of the 1950s, commercial health insurers were successfully competing against the
Blues and cutting into their market share. Commercial plans undercut the Blues by using
experience rating to set premiums, rather than community rating. Experience rating
allowed commercial insurers to offer “healthier” individuals and groups lower premiums
than the Blues, which did not adjust their premiums according to risk. Moreover,
commercial health insurers used a variety of methods to prevent enrollment of sicker
individuals into their plans, including outright refusal of coverage. Thus, not only were
commercial insurers attracting healthier individuals away from the Blues, but they were
also leaving them with the sickest and most costly individuals. This created an adverse
selection problem for the Blues as they adjusted their premiums upwards to cover the
costs of their sicker enrollees, which only intensified their problem as the remaining
relatively healthier enrollees switched to cheaper commercial health insurance. In order
to compete with commercial plans, the Blues were eventually forced to convert to
experience rating to formulate premiums.

8

According to National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) data, the percentage of
nonelderly persons (under age 65) with hospital insurance increased over 10% between
1959 and 1968, reaching 79.3% in 1968, mostly in employer-sponsored insurance (Cohen
et al. 2009, 4). As the connection between employment and health insurance
strengthened, certain segments of the population, particularly the elderly, low income
workers and the unemployed, were unable to purchase health insurance or pay for
medical care. Although insurance plans for individuals had been offered alongside group
plans (they accounted for around 21% of all hospital insurance coverage by 19501) many
were unable to afford these plans. During the 1950s this became a subject of serious
social and political concern and resulted in federal aid through several initiatives. These
efforts culminated in the passage of the Social Security Amendments of 1965, which
created the Medicare and Medicaid programs to provide health care for the individuals
over the age of 65 and low-income and disabled individuals.

The Rise of Managed Care and Industry Consolidation: 1970s to 2000s
Although health care costs had risen during the previous decades, these were
generally absorbed by employers who were enjoying their relative prosperity. By the
1970s, however, U.S. industry was beginning to face competition from Western Europe
and Japan which, combined with growing inflation, drastically changed the country’s
economic environment. As businesses and state and federal governments were forced to
watch their budgets more closely, rising costs in the health care sector could no longer be

1

Calculations based on historical health insurance data in the U.S. Census Bureau’s “Historical Statistics of
the United States—Colonial Times to 1970,” Vital Statistics and Health and Medical Care, Series B 401412.
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overlooked and became an area of major concern. Between 1960 and 1970, national
health care expenditures increased from 5.2% to 7.2% of GDP—by 1980, this percentage
grew to 9.2% (National Health Expenditure Accounts). This was the beginning of the
end for the provider-insurer pact as conflicts between insurers and providers ensued.
Insurance companies, facing increased pressure to contain rising premiums, demanded
that hospitals and other providers lower their costs as well. The legal separation in 1972
of Blue Cross and the American Hospital Association, which had historically influenced
the insurer’s operations, exemplified the break between providers and insurers
(Bodenheimer and Grumbach 2008, 196).
Businesses, which were now the main source of health insurance for individuals
began to demand lower prices from health insurers. Many large employers moved
towards self-insurance, an arrangement which allowed employers to bear the risk of their
employees’ health care expenditures while using health insurance companies for
administrative tasks only. The federal and state governments also pressured insurers to
decrease their costs through payment reforms in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
In an attempt to control costs, the health insurance industry moved towards managed care
arrangements which included prospective payments to providers. Rather than paying
providers a fee for individual services, plans made periodic (usually monthly) payments
to provider per member to cover the costs of services provided during that time period.
Managed care plans integrated “the financing and delivery of appropriate health care
services to cover individuals” and used selective contracting among providers to foster
competition and decrease costs. These plans also included substantial financial
incentives for members to use providers in the provider network and procedures covered
10

by the plan. The passage of the HMO Act of 1973 led to a proliferation of HMOs as it
provided federal subsidies for the creation of prepaid group practices and required certain
employers offering health insurance to also offer an HMO plan if requested by
employees. HMOs gained popularity until the 1990s when Preferred Provider
Organizations (PPOs) attracted consumers away from the unpopular HMO restrictions;
PPOs allowed a wider choice of providers and greater service flexibility. From 1968 to
1980, the percentage of nonelderly persons with private insurance remained steady at
79%. Due to population growth, however, the total number of nonelderly insured persons
increased by 9.6% (Cohen el al. 2009, 4). After the initial growth of the Medicaid
program following its implementation, the number recipients of public health assistance
as a percentage of the nonelderly population reached 12% by 1988. The individual
insurance market covered 9% of the nonelderly population and accounted for only 14%
of health insurance market coverage (excluding public assistance).2
Changes in U.S. economic conditions, particularly the economic downturns
during the early 1980s and early 1990s, affected the rate of employer-sponsored health
coverage. Between 1988 and 1995, the percentage of nonelderly persons with employerprovided health insurance decreased from 66% to 64%.3 It is likely that a significant
portion of this decrease was in insurance coverage by smaller employers for whom any
cost increases or profit decreases would have a larger impact compared to larger
employers. At the same time, the percentage of nonelderly individuals with public
2

Calculations based on March 1898 Current Population Survey data found in the Employee Benefit
Research Institute publication, EBRI Issue Brief “Update: Americans Without Health Insurance,” July,
1990 No. 104. Totals may not equal 100% as some individuals may have multiple sources of insurance.
3
Calculations based on March 1898 Current Population Survey data in the EBRI Issue Brief No. 104 and
on March 1996 Current Population Survey data found in the EBRI Issue Brief "Sources of Health Insurance
and Characteristics of the Uninsured: Analysis of the March 1996 Current Population Survey," November
1996 No.179. Totals may not equal 100% as some individuals may have multiple sources of insurance.
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insurance increased from 12% to 17%. As public insurance absorbed some of the
decrease in employer-sponsored insurance, it mitigated the potential increase in
uninsurance to only 1%, to reach 17% in 1995. Individual insurance market participation
as a percent of all health insurance (excluding public assistance) decreased to 11%.3
In this economic environment, increased competition between insurers and
between providers slowed the growth of health care costs during the 1990s (Healthcare
Timeline). During the 1980s national health care expenditures as a percentage of GDP
had increased by 3%, from 9.2% to 12.5%. Between 1990 and 1999, the growth in
national health care expenditures slowed to 1.3%, increasing to 13.8% of GDP in 1999
(National Health Expenditure Accounts). The federal government passed payment
reforms that allowed it to decrease Medicare and Medicaid inflation and employers were
able to bargain with managed care organizations for lower premiums which cut into the
profit margins of health care providers and insurers.

To survive this competitive

environment, both insurers and providers merged and consolidated to increase their
bargaining power. Large health insurance plans purchased smaller plans and merged
with other plans. Providers, particularly hospitals, also consolidated into multihospital
systems or networks and the increasing number of physician specialists joined singlespecialty groups (Bodenheimer and Grumbach 2008, 199). This increased their
bargaining power, allowing them to counteract cost-containing pressure from purchasers.

Recent Trends Prior to the Affordable Care Act
As the U.S. economy improved in the latter half of the 1990s, the percent of
nonelderly persons with employer-sponsored insurance increased to 67% in 2000, while
12

uninsureds dropped to 16%.4 During the 2000s however, a recession at the beginning of
the decade, and increased international competition from developing economies, led to
changes in the distribution of insurance coverage and to an overall increase in the rate of
uninsurance. By 2010, only 59% of nonelderly persons had employer sponsored
insurance, 7% purchased other private insurance, 22% were covered by public programs
and 18% were uninsured.4 Once again, a rise in public health coverage mitigated
potential increases in uninsurance. Although commercial insurers had seen their
enrollment in employer-sponsored insurance shrink, many began serving Medicaid and
Medicare over the last two decades as states and the federal government opened their
programs to commercial insurers.
While health insurance coverage declined, health care expenditures increased
dramatically. From 2000 to 2010, total national health care expenditures as a percent of
GDP increased from 13.8% to 17.9% (National Health Expenditure Accounts). Although
the federal and state governments account for more than half of these expenditures,
businesses have also encountered higher costs for providing health insurance. Small
businesses especially, have struggled with these increases. According to the Kaiser
Health Benefits Summary, the percent of employers with less than 200 employees
offering health insurance benefits dropped from 68% to 59% between 2000 and 2010
(Employer Health Benefits 2011 Summary of Findings 2011, 5). This decrease does not
account for employees who decided not to purchase offered insurance due to rising
premiums. In their 1999 publication, Kronick and Gilmore examine the sensitivity of
4

Calculations based on March 2001 Current Population Survey data in the EBRI Issue Brief No. 240
"Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the Uninsured: Analysis of the March 2000 Current
Population Survey," December 2001. Totals may not equal 100% as some individuals may have multiple
sources of insurance.
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employees to changes in health care costs by modeling the probability of being insured as
a function of the ratio of per capita health care expenditure to personal income and other
demographic and employment characteristics. They find that increasing per capital
health care expenditures account for most of the observed changes in health insurance
coverage (Kronick and Gilmore, 1999 42). If low-income workers are no longer able to
afford insurance offered by their employers, the individual health insurance market would
even be an alternative since those prices are likely to be even greater. As a matter of fact,
it seems unlikely that the individual insurance market has absorbed people who
previously had employer-sponsored insurance since its enrollment has remained
relatively steady at about 7% of the nonelderly population over the last two decades. Due
to the decrease in group insurance, however, individual insurance participation increased
slightly to 12% of all health insurance (excluding public assistance) in 2010.5
In all sectors of the health insurance market (both private and public), strong
insurer bargaining power (and provider power to a certain extent) and the limited ability
of businesses and the federal and state governments to absorb increasing costs, has
resulted in a redirection of a growing portion of costs to consumers, who are generally
price-takers. This has sparked a trend towards “consumer-directed” cost-containment
measures aimed at increasing consumers’ sensitivity to medical care costs and include
increased cost-sharing, as well as less expensive plans with less comprehensive benefits.
These cheaper plans include low-premium, high-deductible health plans that allow people
to pay for out-of-pocket expenses through tax-advantaged Health Savings Accounts and
5

Calculations based on March 2011 Current Population Survey data in the EBRI Issue Brief No. 347
"Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the Uninsured: Analysis of the March 2011 Current
Population Survey," September 2011. Totals may not equal 100% as some individuals may have multiple
sources of insurance.

14

plans with limited health benefits. These types of plans often fail to cover all the health
care services individuals need and render their purchase unaffordable. This inadequate
health insurance is creating an ever growing group of “underinsured” persons (Austin and
Hungerford 2009, 9). Thus, it is increasingly the case that health insurance purchasers,
particularly in individual and small group markets who have little bargaining power are
unable to afford high costs and become underinsured or completely uninsured.

Origins of the Health Insurance Exchange
The current concept of the health insurance exchange evolved from the idea of
“managed competition,” which originated during the 1970s when the lack of competition
and insensitivity to costs described in the previous section characterized the national
health care sector. Although similar concepts were developed prior to Alain Enthoven’s
first exposition, he is still regarded by most as the “father” of managed competition, since
his has been the most thorough explanation of the concept.
The original inspiration for his and others’ early models was the Federal
Employees’ Health Benefits (FEHB) Program. Through a combination of political
circumstances rather than a distinct policy design, Congress adopted the FEHB Program
in 1959 after a five-year battle between competing and well-organized interest groups to
design a system to provide health benefits to federal employees. These represented the
entire spectrum of interests, such as the American Medical Association, the Blues,
employee unions, insurance companies, other health care prepayment plans and the
federal government as an employer. As a result, many different alternatives were
considered, ranging from a single indemnity-type medical plan for all employees, to pre15

determined government contributions for any kind of prepaid health plan an employee
could find on the market. As the final compromise, the FEHB program was designed to
offer a wide variety of competitive plan choices for employees, which reflected the wide
variety of interests of its designers. Through the FEHB Program, the federal government
began offering millions of its employees, retirees and dependents throughout the country
a choice between hundreds of different health care financing and delivery plans.
Despite initial challenges, the overall success of the FEHB Program convinced
various states like California and Minnesota to adopt similar programs for their
employees and retirees. Moreover, it sparked interest in the feasibility of developing a
similar program on a national scale to cover the rest of the population. In a 1967
publication, K. L. White suggests a similar system of organized competition in the United
States that would include “multiple, local and regional competing systems” (White 1967,
7). In 1971, Ellwood, McClure and colleagues proposed a national “Health Maintenance
Strategy” in which HMOs would become the main health insurance and health care
providers for both the private and public spheres within a highly competitive private
market. This paper was the basis of and the impetus for, the HMO Act of 1973, which
removed many existing barriers to the creation of HMOs. While serving in the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare during the Nixon administration in 1973,
Scott Fleming designed a national health insurance model called “Structured Competition
within the Private Sector.” In it, he described practical ways to extend the FEHB
Program to the whole population. According to Enthoven, the works of Ellwood,
McClure and Fleming served as the building blocks for his own national health plan
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called the “Consumer Choice Health Plan,” which he proposed to the Carter
administration in 1977 (Enthoven 1993, 27-28).
Although each of these health care reform ideas is unique, all are examples of
what Charles Schultze, President Carter’s chair of the Council of Economic Advisors
promoted as the most effective reform strategy in a series of essays titled, “The Public
Use of Private Interest” in the 1970s. These essays described ways to achieve sociallydesirable goals while minimizing direct government intervention in economic matters and
discouraging command-and control strategies. The private and public actors (i.e.,
businesses and government) would create market-based incentives in areas where they do
not already exist that would move individuals towards socially-desirable ends. White,
Ellwood, et al., Fleming and Enthoven apply this strategy to the health care sector (some
unknowingly) by promoting the creation of specific incentives for a private, market-based
system in which health care providers and insurers compete on the basis of value and
quality.
Since his original publication in 1977, Enthoven has modified and clarified his
original description of the Consumer Choice Health Plan and managed competition
several times to counter criticisms and misunderstanding. In his 1993 publication, he
defines managed competition as “a purchasing strategy to obtain maximum value for
money for employers and consumers” (Enthoven 1993, 29). Central to this strategy are
what Enthoven calls “sponsors,” which act on behalf of a group of purchasers. Sponsors
ensure that eligible individuals can obtain health care services at a reasonable price by
managing the health insurance market. Through their various iterations, sponsors have
also been called “purchasing cooperatives,” or “health alliances,” but are currently
17

referred to as “health insurance exchanges” or “health benefits exchanges.” Sponsors
represent purchasers in a particular geographic area, and actively work to correct or
mitigate health care market imperfections which have led to decreased competition,
poorer health outcomes, limited access for those with the greatest health care needs, and
increased costs. These market imperfections or market failures are more thoroughly
explained in Chapter III.
The character of the sponsor is vital to the success of managed competition.
According to Enthoven, sponsors must have:
the ability to use judgment to achieve goals in the face of uncertainty, to
negotiate, and to make decisions on the basis of imperfect information. It takes
more than mere passive administration of inflexible rules to make this market
work (Enthoven 1993, 29).
Enthoven describes five main tasks which sponsors are required to perform in
order to create a structure of managed competition. First, they must establish and enforce
rules of equity to ensure that all eligible individuals have access to health insurance.
Ideally, sponsors would mandate that all plans accept any eligible individual and apply a
community rating (or restricted departures from it), guarantee access (subsidized, if
necessary) to a baseline plan, ensure continuous coverage once an individual is enrolled,
and prohibit any limitations or exclusions based on pre-existing conditions. Second,
sponsors should have some freedom to select participating plans based on factors such as
price and covered benefits. Third, sponsors must be the only access point for eligible
individuals to enroll in participating health plans and establish contractual payment terms
with participants. Fourth, sponsors must create a competitive environment in which plans
have an incentive to increase efficiency, quality and decrease their premiums. They may
do so by ensuring that subsidies never exceed the lowest-priced plan so that there is
18

always an incentive to decrease the cost of a plan, standardize plans, publish quality
information for participating plans and allow individuals to choose plans at an individual,
rather than employment-group level. Finally, sponsors must manage risk selection so that
all participating plans are compensated based on the relative riskiness of their enrollees
so that plans do not have incentives to select individuals they believe have lower risks
(Enthoven 1993, 31-35).
Enthoven’s idea of managed competition is based on a purchasing agent actively
working on behalf of a group of purchasers, both individuals and employers. Although
current formulations of health insurance exchanges vary widely on the degree of
“activity” performed by the exchanges, they are all built on Enthoven’s central concept of
a collective agent that facilitates the purchase of health insurance for those with limited or
no access. It is interesting to note that Enthoven believes that health insurance is social
insurance and that universal, or near universal health insurance coverage is necessary for
the success of managed competition. Moreover, he believes that all, or as many as
possible, of the individuals covered must participate in the financing of the system.
Enthoven gives various methods to ensure financial participation, including a mandate on
employers to provide coverage to their employees, a requirement that all households
purchase insurance or taxation, but does not seem particularly inclined towards any one
method.

Origins of the Individual Mandate
The individual mandate is an approach to achieving universal health care in a
system in which health insurance is the main vehicle for obtaining health care. For some,
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access to health care is a human right, for others it is an essential part of a just and
humane society or a necessary prerequisite for equality of opportunity. In a system in
which health care is purchased through health insurance, and uninsurance is often
synonymous with no access to health care, all individuals must obtain health insurance to
achieve universal access to health care. Although the idea of requiring health care
insurance for all citizens is not new to health care policy discussions, it has generally
been within the framework of a government-run health care system. Another related
idea, of an “employer” mandate requiring all employers (usually above a specified size)
to provide their employees with some minimum health benefit package, has also been
discussed at the national level for some time. The individual mandate in the context of a
private-sector health care system, however, was first described by Stuart M. Butler and
Edmund Haislmaier describe in their 1989 publication, “A National Health System for
America.”
The main goals of Butler and Haislmaier’s National Health System are to control
rising health care costs and provide access to health care to a growing number of
individuals unable to obtain needed care. Their plan to create a “consumer-oriented,
market-based, comprehensive American health system” requires that every resident of the
United States enroll in a minimum catastrophic health care plan, shifting the
responsibility of obtaining health care coverage to families rather than employers, and
limiting the government’s role to that of monitoring and encouraging competition in the
private health care market and subsidizing needy individuals (Butler and Haislmaier
1989, 51-52). In order to foster more cost-conscious behavior by health care consumers,
which they believe is essential to controlling costs, Butler and Haislmaier’s plan
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eliminates the tax exclusion for payments made by employers for employee health
insurance and replaces it with tax deductions or credits to personal income tax for out-ofpocket expenses. This would serve to disconnect employment from health insurance
provision. Their plan also mandates that every individual purchase health insurance and
pay most routine costs out-of-pocket. Butler and Haislmaier believe this combination of
incentives would reduce the insensitivity to health care costs experienced by the insured.
At the same time, the government would provide financial support to those unable to
purchase insurance or pay for necessary health care on their own.
Butler and Haislmaier view the requirement that every resident purchase health
insurance as part of a contract between these individuals and the U.S. government:
in return for the government’s accepting an obligation to devise a market-based
system guaranteeing access to care and protecting all families from financial
distress due to the cost of an illness, each individual must agree to obtain a
minimum level of protection (Butler and Haislmaier 1989, 52).
This would prevent any individuals with the ability to purchase insurance from
becoming “free riders,” who force their costs onto others in the case of an emergency.6
Although the authors maintain that the level of mandatory protection remains to be
debated, they do mention that all households must protect themselves from large,
unforeseen medical costs by purchasing health insurance or face a penalty or fee. They

6

As part of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 (COBRA), Congress passed the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) to ensure public access to emergency services
regardless of the ability to pay. In one of its provisions, EMTALA amends Section 1867 of the Social
Security Act to require Medicare-participating hospitals with emergency departments to screen and treat the
emergency medical conditions of patients in a non-discriminatory manner to anyone, regardless of their
ability to pay, insurance status, national origin, race, creed or color. Charity care that was once provided by
local and state governments was shifted to hospitals, who were now obligated to care for anyone one an
emergency medical condition, effectively making EMTALA the national health care policy for the
uninsured. Since hospitals do not receive direct funding from the Federal government for any such
emergency care that they provide to the uninsured or underinsured “free riders,” they shift those
uncompensated costs onto other patients or payers.
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viewed this individual mandate in the context of catastrophic insurance, rather than social
insurance as in Enthoven’s model.
In 1991, Pauly, Damon, Feldstein and Hoff published “A Plan for 'Responsible
National Health Insurance,’” in which they propose their own national health insurance
structure. Similar to the Heritage Foundation publication, Pauly et al. also require that
everyone purchase at least a minimum level of insurance. They also argue for
individually mandated insurance coverage on the basis that it is both more “humane” to
provide health care on a timely and systematic basis for everyone rather than through
“haphazard” uncompensated care and Medicaid eligibility. This would be less costly for
society which would otherwise pay for this expensive haphazard care, usually given to
the uninsured in late stages of illness. Like Butler and Haislmaier, they suggest changing
the tax structure so that individuals receive tax credits, rather than employers, with
employees enjoying the tax-free treatment of their health insurance costs. They also
believe individuals will be more cost-conscious if they are purchasing their insurance
themselves rather than paying a portion of the costs through their employer. Pauly et al.
do, however, provide more details on the minimum coverage requirement set by the
government, which would offer a combination of preventive and acute care services
determined to be most cost-effective and beneficial. While the price of these plans would
be tiered by income, those with the ability to do so would have the opportunity to
purchase higher-cost plans with a more expansive benefit package. Low-income
individuals could receive tax subsidies from welfare agencies who would then receive the
individual’s tax credit once it arrived.
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Evolution of Health Care Reform: the Health Insurance Exchange and the
Individual Mandate
Although serious national health care reform efforts did not begin until after the
Great Depression, health reforms at more than a single-state level was being proposed as
early as 1912 when Theodore Roosevelt campaigned for national health service as part of
the Progressive party platform (Minor/Third Party Platforms: “Progressive Party Platform
of 1912”). National health care reform efforts during the 1920s were limited and faced
significant opposition as it was likened to Germany’s “socialized medicine” (Palmer,
1999). During the 1930s President Franklin D. Roosevelt considered, but did not
officially propose, national health reform both before and after the passage of the Social
Security Act in 1935 that included compulsory health insurance for residents of states
deciding to participate in the system. In 1945, President Harry Truman introduced a
proposal through which the federal government would provide universal, yet voluntary,
health insurance to all citizens. Truman’s plan faced tremendous opposition and was
criticized as being a gateway to socialism. Subsequently, health care reform efforts
subsided as access to health care and health insurance expanded during the prosperous
post-WWII years.
A resurgence of interest in national health care during the 1970s produced a wide
variety of proposals, none of which succeeded in becoming law. Some plans, like two
separate plans proposed by Senator Edward Kennedy and Representative Martha
Griffiths in 1970 placed the federal government as the universal, single-payer for health
insurance or the organizer of a top-down, strictly budgeted, health care system providing
universal health care coverage for all citizens. Other proposals, like the Comprehensive
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Health Insurance Act presented by President Nixon in 1974, and President Carter’s Phase
I National Health Plan proposal of 1979 included mandates that employers provide a
minimum level of health insurance to their employees, usually referred to as “employer
mandates.” The federal government would provide health care insurance to the poor,
aged and unemployed. Other reforms proposed some sort of income-tax credits
dependent on family income levels that would be provided to individuals purchasing
insurance, like the Fulton-Broyhill bill in 1970. Other notable bills, including a proposal
by Senator Javits in 1970, expanded Medicare to all citizens (Sommers 1971, 127-134).
After another lull in health care reform efforts, President Bill Clinton made the
next serious attempt at restructuring the national health care system through another
Health Security Act which he presented in 1993. Some of its more radical provisions
were:
•

Employer mandate: required employers to make premium contribution
payments equal to those of any eligible individuals they employ.

•

Individual mandate: No “eligible individuals” could disenroll from a
health plan before enrolling in a different plan or Medicare.

•

Defined a minimum, standard benefit package and outlined three choices
for cost-sharing arrangements that all plans must follow.

•

Required the state to create at least one “regional alliance.” These
followed the principles of managed competition described by Enthoven
and controlled the availability of health plans, enforced health budgets,
enrolled employers and employees in the new system, collected premiums,
and generally enforced the national insurance rules and regulations.
Regional alliances would provide a selection of health plans, including at
least one fee-for-service plan, from which eligible individuals could
choose.

•

Any individuals purchasing a plan providing wider benefits than the
minimum benefit package could do so with their own after-tax dollars.
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The Clinton Health Security Act proposed a radical change to the operation of the
health insurance industry in the United States. For various reasons beyond the scope of
this paper, the Clinton plan was defeated. Although it represented one of the first largescale plans to include both an individual mandate and the idea of a health care exchange
or managed competition, the inclusion of an employer mandate and requirement to
contribute to employees’ health insurance costs would have actually strengthen the
relationship between employers and the provision of health care. This deviates
significantly from the ideas of individual responsibility and cost-consciousness at the
crux of Stuart’s original concept of the individual mandate.
Republicans countered the Clinton Health Security Act with various proposals, a
few of which included a provision requiring individuals to purchase some type of health
insurance. At the time, conservatives presented the individual mandate, which supported
ideal of individual responsibility, as a better alternative to the employer mandate in the
Clinton plan as well as any government-run plans. Republican bills like Representative
Rick Santorum and Senator Phil Gramm’s “Comprehensive Family Health Access and
Savings Act” and Representative Cliff Stearns and Senator Don Nickels’ “Consumer
Choice Health Security Act” possessed de facto individual mandates, although they were
not called as such, through various penalties for lack of insurance (Latino 2011). The
“Health and Equity Access Reform Today Act of 1993,” sponsored by Republican
Senator John Chafee is one of the more detailed republican proposals of that time. It
explicitly required individuals to purchase health insurance, except for religious reasons.
Chafee’s proposal would have created a federal Benefits Commission to set
standards for health insurance plans. Each state would organize purchasing groups (not
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more than one covering the same geographical area) to accept small employers, and
eligible employees and individuals, market qualified plans to members, enter into
agreements with qualified plans and small employers, and enroll eligible individuals in
qualified plans. The purchasing groups would also disseminate information regarding
available insurance plans. They could accept premiums on behalf of individuals, but
were not held responsible in cases on non-payment. The proposal also required large
employers to follow certain guidelines including providing a certain minimum number
and types of plans and did not allow them to purchase health insurance through the
individual and small employer purchasing groups. Although employers of all sizes
would be required to provide health insurance options to their eligible employees, they
were not required to make a contribution towards employees’ health care coverage. Lowincome individuals not enrolled in Medicaid would receive vouchers to help pay for
health insurance premiums. Chafee’s proposal essentially incorporated a health
insurance exchange but limited its scope by excluding all large employers from
participating. It is interesting to note, that the Massachusetts health exchange also
excludes regular employees (not temporary or part-time employees) of large employers.
While interest in sweeping national health care reforms waned after the failure of
the Clinton Health Security Act individual states embraced the idea of increasing access
to health insurance for underserved markets through health care exchanges. Small-group
markets have been especially targeted as policy makers believed that health insurance
exchanges or even purchasing pools or cooperatives would simplify and decrease the
costs to small employers of offering health insurance. States like New York, Utah and
Connecticut currently operate health insurance exchanges (either publicly, through a
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public-private partnership or a not-for-profit entity). California’s small business
exchange, the Health Insurance Plan of California (HIPC), later renamed PacAdvantage,
began operations in 1993, but the high costs of its enrollees rendered the program
unsustainable by 2006 (Kramer and Weinberg 2011, 2).
Despite the apparent popularity of health exchanges or purchasing pools for the
small-business or individual markets, these mechanisms were rarely expanded to
encompass a greater section of the population. In 2004, the District of Columbia
insurance commissioner proposed legislation that would have created a state-wide
insurance exchange. Maryland and Massachusetts proposed a similar model in 2006. All
three state proposals allowed a much larger segment of the state population to benefit
from the proposed exchange than previous proposals which were limited to small-groups.
Unlike the Massachusetts reform which has now been implemented for 5 years, the D.C.
and Maryland proposals did not include an individual mandate (or employer mandate).
The Massachusetts’s health exchange, named the Commonwealth Health Insurance
Connector Authority (the Connector), provides health insurance options to low income
individuals in public health programs like Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance
Plan, who receive individual subsidies. Through a separate program, the Connector
offers health insurance choices to individuals and families, young adults, employees, and
small employers. Health plans must meet certain standards to participate in the
Connector and are grouped into four categories based on actuarial value to facilitate
comparisons for consumers. Individuals over the age of 18 must purchase health
insurance, or face financial penalties. Exceptions are made based on religion, or financial
hardship that makes even the cheapest plan unaffordable. While all employers with more
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than ten full-time employees must also provide health insurance to employees or face
financial penalties, only those with fewer than 50 full time employees may offer plans
through the exchange.
In 2007, the next major national health reform, the Healthy Americans Act, was
introduced by Democratic Senator Ron Wyden. It required all eligible adults to enroll in
a health insurance plan, including a Healthy Americans Private Insurance Plan created
through the bill. The bill did not pass in 2007, and Senators Wyden and Bennett
reintroduced the legislation in 2009. Due to its support from both Republicans and
Democrats, it was considered by many to be the only truly bipartisan alternative during
the national health care reform debate that culminated in the passage of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act in 2010 (ACA).
The Wyden-Bennett proposal also included an individual mandate and set forth
penalties for those who remained uninsured but did not qualify for an exclusion (i.e., for
religious reasons). The plan would have gone the farthest to weaken the link between
employment and health insurance as it required all individuals to purchase one of the
insurance plans listed by state-run health insurance exchanges and provided generous tax
deductions as well as sliding scale subsidies for low-income individuals. It also required
employers to contribute towards employee health insurance costs if they provided them
insurance, while eliminating the current tax exclusion for employer-sponsored insurance.
At the same time, employers could increase worker wages by the amount of health
insurance premiums instead of making health insurance contributions (Kaiser Family
Foundation). While this bill more closely represented the concepts of the health care
exchange and individual mandate than the alternatives, it was considered too radical by
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many. Moreover, critics were concerned that the bill would not provide a long-term
solution to the health care problem since some of the provisions in the bill were to be
phased out after some years. Similar to this proposal, the national health care reform that
finally passed in 2010, the ACA, also included an individual mandate and health
insurance exchanges (at the state or multi-state level), but does much less to weaken the
link between employment and health insurance. The ACA, which is currently being
implemented (and debated) is explained in more detail in the following chapter.
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ECONOMICS OF THE HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGE
Economic Theory and the Health Insurance Exchange
Perfectly Competitive Markets
Although unrealistic, the neoclassical ideal of the perfectly competitive market
provides a great starting point for the evaluation of real-life markets. In a perfectly
competitive market, rational economic actors act in their own self-interest, and in doing
so, efficiently allocate available resources to produce goods valued by consumers. This
market requires the following characteristics to reach economic efficiency:
•

A large number of buyers and sellers. Due to their small size and small
market share, prices are determined by supply and demand—they are all
price-takers. No one seller nor buyer, may influence the market price of a
good. In other words, each seller faces a horizontal demand curve so that
changing its production would change the quantity sold, but not the price.
As a result, a seller’s average revenue is the same as the marginal revenue
from each additional good so the market price is equal to marginal
revenue. Similarly, each buyer faces a horizontal supply curve, so that
changing the quantity of goods purchased does not affect the price. A
buyer’s average utility is the same as the marginal utility from each
additional good, so the market price is also equal to the marginal utility.
Thus, in the long run, both sellers and buyers maximize their gains.
Moreover, demand and supply are independent so that suppliers cannot
influence buyers’ demand.

•

Goods in the market are homogenous so that any one may be substituted
for another.

•

There is perfect information so that all sellers know the prices and costs of
other sellers and all buyers know all sellers’ prices. Additionally, all
buyers have complete knowledge regarding the good they are purchasing
and all sellers have access to the same technology.
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•

Firms do not encounter any barriers to the entry into, or exit from the
market.

•

There are no transaction costs so that neither buyers nor sellers incur
additional costs when making a transaction.

•

There are no externalities from the production or consumption of a good.
All costs or benefits from a transaction are captured by its price.

If all conditions are satisfied, the market for a good is completely competitive
and, according to Neoclassical theory, the market will function efficiently.

Health Insurance: Market Failure
Due to the complicated nature of the health care system, and the current emphasis
on health care insurance as the main vehicle for receiving health care services, this paper
will focus on the relationship between health care consumers and health care insurers
while indirectly referring to issues regarding providers. More often than not, markets do
not actually satisfy all conditions of perfect competition, in which case the markets “fail”
to bring about economic efficiency. Although most markets experience market failures,
the market for health care and health insurance is exceptional in that it does not satisfy
any of the conditions for perfect competition. As a result, health care resources are not
allocated efficiently and goods (i.e., health insurance and health care) are not produced in
the appropriate quantity at the appropriate price to maximize the welfare of all
participants. Moreover, goods are priced higher than in a perfectly competitive market
and undersupplied. As will be explained below, the existing market favors the suppliers
of health insurance over consumers, or potential consumers, of health insurance, allowing
the former to reap substantial gains at the expense of the latter.
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Size Matters: Industry Concentration
The health care system is largely characterized by a substantial level of
concentration of providers, certain purchasers, and insurers. As mentioned in the
previous chapter, large hospital systems and multi-physician groups have become quite
common. Some large purchasers, such as the federal government, are able to set prices or
establish restrictive pricing mechanisms though Medicare and FEHB, states through
Medicaid, and some very large employers. Similarly, most health care researchers agree
that the health insurer consolidations over the last few decades have resulted in highly
concentrated health insurance markets. In a 2004 study James Robinson examined
concentration in the health insurance industry for 47 states and the District of Columbia
and found that the largest three insurance companies controlled at least 50% of the
market in all but three states (Robinson 2004, 13). A study conducted by the AMA in
2007 using the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission guidelines, found
that the combined HMO and PPO markets were highly concentrated in over 90% of
metropolitan statistic areas (Competition in health insurance: A comprehensive study of
U.S. markets: 2007 update, 5). A 2004 study by the Government Accountability Office
focusing on the small group health insurance market also found a high degree of insurer
concentration in most states (Austin and Hungerford 2009, 27-28).
The degree of concentration in the health insurance industry is aided by the
presence of diseconomies of small scale and the nature of pooling. The unit costs for
health insurers decrease as they increase in size, so a large number of competing insurers
would result in higher unit costs. On the other hand, a monopolistic insurer would
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probably exploit decreased unit costs and inflate its prices to increase its profit. In either
scenario, the market would fail as some consumers would not be willing to pay the
inflated prices for insurance. Various studies, however, have found that health insurer
concentration allows them to extract lower prices from large hospital associations and
other provider groups, thereby countering the potential bargaining power of providers
(Melnick, Shen and Wu 2011, 1730). It is unclear whether insurers, especially
commercial insurers responsible for increasing shareholder value, would pass lower costs
on to smaller consumers. Several studies have found “little empirical evidence on
competitive conduct by health insurance firms” (Dafny 2010, 1399). Leemore Dafny
considered whether insurers can affect prices by examining their ability to extract rents
from large employers when the latter experience positive profit shocks. Dafny concluded
that insurers, even in markets with 10 or fewer insurers and particularly in markets with 6
or less insurers, were able to extract price increases from employers whose profits had
increased.
This data supports the popular belief that the health insurance market is
oligopolistic, with a few, large sellers dominating the market. As a result of their size,
these large, dominant sellers no longer face a horizontal demand curve, but rather a
downward-sloping curve, which allows them to influence prices by altering production.
These sellers are able to price goods above their marginal costs such that the quantity
demanded (and supplied) at this higher price is lower than what it would be in a perfectly
competitive market. The high prices and low supply of health insurance resulting from
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this structure are exacerbated further by the presence of additional failures in health
insurance markets.

Insurance Product Heterogeneity
Health insurance products are many and varied. There are several types of health
insurance plans represented by various letter combinations: HMOs, PPOs, CDHPs
(Consumer Directed Health Plans) with HSAs, and whichever new products insurers are
enthusiastically devising. This variety is compounded by the fact that these plans
contract with different providers, who undoubtedly provide care of varying quality.
According to Austin and Hungerford, the demand for health insurance is a function of an
individual’s level of risk aversion, the variability of medical expenses, the effectiveness
and level of benefits covered by the insurance, income, premiums and the level of costsharing (Austin and Hungerford 2009, 15). Thus, the different insurance products which
provide different benefits, and often different levels of cost-sharing, are not perfect
substitutes.

Imperfect Information
Insurance products and the health care they cover are very difficult to understand.
The heterogeneity of insurance products makes understanding products and product
differences difficult for consumers. Moreover, insurance contracts are incredibly
complex and insurance companies have been known to make them even more difficult to
understand if they believed that it would increase their profits. At the same time,
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information regarding the quality of benefits and providers covered by a plan is difficult
to obtain and examine. Health and health care services are also difficult to understand
and require many years of specialized training and certification. Thus, not only would
average or even above average consumers find it incredibly difficult to understand
insurance products, they would also find it difficult to know which health care services
they need. As a matter of fact, consumers rely on physicians to tell them what services
they need. This creates a “principal-agent” problem because the physicians may have
incentives to act in their own best interest rather than their patients’. This is of particular
concern in fee-for-service models where physician payment is positively correlated to the
amount of services they provide, or if certain services are reimbursed above cost.
Asymmetries of information between consumers and insurers and the inherent
uncertainty in future health care needs also result in adverse selection and moral hazard.
Consumers have more information about their own health care needs than insurers. As a
result, insurers may price premiums so that relatively healthier people are not willing to
pay the premiums. If this occurs, the overall premiums for the remaining group of
insured people will rise as the overall “health” of members is poorer. As premiums
increase, those with lower expected health care costs will forego coverage. If this
continues, insurers are forced to charge high premiums which leave high-risk consumers
unable to afford the premiums and prevent lower-risk consumers who would be willing to
pay for lower premiums, from purchasing insurance. Although only the latter case
represents adverse selection, since a good that individuals would be willing and able to
purchase is not offered, society generally disapproves of both types of uninsurance.
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In order to avoid this, health insurers have tried to attract healthier customers
through experience rating which calculates their premiums based on previous health care
experience, and by offering cheaper, specialized insurance products. At the same time,
they have tried to discourage enrollment of sicker customers by charging unaffordable
premiums, refusing to cover expensive services based on pre-existing conditions or
refusing to cover sicker customers altogether. This process of “skimming” or “creaming
off” was used by commercial insurers to compete against the Blues who were left with
the sickest and most costly enrollees. High-risk pools created by various states have had
limited success due to adverse selection. Since sicker individuals are more likely to pay
more for insurance, they increase the cost of care, while healthier, low cost clients who
would help balance the risk pool, forego the expensive insurance. The insurer is thus left
with only the most expensive, sicker enrollees. Research on the subject spanning three
decades suggests that adverse selection is quantitatively large (Austin and Hungerford
2009, 17). Adverse selection is especially problematic in the individual and small group
markets since the baseline for their premiums is higher than for the large group market.
Insurers' lack of information regarding the future health needs of their customers
is exacerbated by moral hazard. Individuals’ demand for health care may change once
they are insured and result in their overconsumption of health care. Insured individuals,
for example, may seek care for more minor conditions, more costly procedures, or
additional discretionary care than they would if they were not insured. Moreover, they
may engage in more risky behaviors or unhealthy habits since they know they may easily
access health care if need. As a result, insurers may pay more for consumers’ health care
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than the consumers themselves, had the latter paid for services with their own money. In
a similar vein, individuals may wait until they become sick to purchase health insurance
or switch to a plan with more comprehensive coverage provided by unknowing insurers.
Insurers attempt to prevent this by limiting enrollment periods to specific, limited time
periods, usually only once a year. Providers may also engage in moral hazard if they
alter their provision of health care based on differences in compensation they receive for
different procedures. If they receive compensation above their costs for certain
procedures, for example, they may recommend those procedures more often than they
would otherwise and more often than procedures for which they receive a lower
compensation.

Barriers to Entry and Exit
Entry into the health insurance market is incredibly difficult due to a variety of
factors. The health insurance industry is complex and requires specialized knowledge. It
would take significant education and training to understand insurance products as well as
insurance financing and risk pooling. In order to enter the health insurance market, a
firm would have to create a network of providers and bargain with pharmaceutical
companies; it would have to compete against the generally large and established insurers
with existing connections to physicians in the area. An entrant would also have to
compete with existing firms for customers. It is not difficult to imagine large existing
insurers dropping their prices to undercut a new entrant. Existing firms also have stable
reputations and well-developed marketing campaigns, which would make it difficult for a
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new entrant to become established. While entry into the market is obviously challenging,
regulations preventing insurers from discontinuing coverage may also make it difficult to
exit the market.

Transaction Costs
Transaction costs in the health insurance industry are relatively high. The cost of
obtaining information on health insurance products and making an informed choice are
inversely related to the size of the group seeking insurance. Larger groups are able to
spread the cost of searching for the appropriate health insurance across more individuals,
while the smallest group, an individual for example, must often work with an insurance
broker who understands insurance products and charges customers a fee for using his
knowledge. Similarly, health insurers include a loading fee in their premiums that
includes administrative costs and profits. Larger groups enjoy economies of scale as
loading costs can be spread across more enrollees, who pay a lower fee individually,
compared to smaller groups. As a matter of fact, a recent study examined the loading
fees for employers of varying sizes. On average, loading fees for employers with less
than 100 employees were 34% of premiums while those for employers with 100 to
99,999 employees were 15%, and those for employers with 100,000 or more employees
were 4% (Abraham, Karaca-Mandic and Phelps 2011, 181).
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Externalities
Most researchers agree that there is a significant correlation between health
insurance coverage, and access to health care and health outcomes. As a result, the
provision of health insurance is closely related to the provision of health care, or lack
thereof. The provision of needed health care has two significant positive effects on
parties outside of the health care transaction and potentially society as a while. First,
healthy individuals are less likely to spread communicable diseases and are more
productive workers. Second, as Donaldson and Gerard explain, certain members of
society receive a “caring” externality from knowing that another person is receiving
necessary health care. This is often characterized by the concern people may have for
those who are less well-off (Donaldson and Gerard 2005, 41). Since health care is so
intimately tied to well-being, many in society believe that access to necessary health care
services should not be denied based on someone’s inability to pay. Just as the provision
of health care has positive externalities, the lack of health care has negative externalities.
If access to necessary vaccines or other services is denied, certain contagious diseases,
for example, could spread throughout the population. If altruistic or caring persons find
out that susceptible individuals are not receiving needed health care, they may be
negatively affected. This group includes people who research and support changes in the
health care system with the goal of improving access to care for those who would
otherwise be neglected.
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The provision of health insurance has an additional effect, as it prevents freeriding. Free riding occurs when individuals are unable to pay for the care they receive.
This happens when the uninsured or underinsured encounter a medical emergency or
illness and seek treatment. Although hospitals and physicians receive some public funds
for uncompensated care through the Medicaid program, they may not be fully
compensated for their services. As a result, hospitals and physicians increase their costs
to regular consumers to offset their losses resulting from free riders. Ultimately, taxpayer funds allocated towards uncompensated care and premiums paid by the uninsured
increase.

Role of Health Insurance Exchanges in Correcting Market Failures
According to Enthoven’s conception of managed competition, “sponsors” or
“health insurance exchanges” would able to correct many of the market failures present
in the health insurance and health care industries. By actively working on behalf of a
group of buyers who would otherwise be fragmented, exchanges would essentially form a
large buyer, converting the individual and small group markets into bilateral oligopolies
(with a small number of buyers and sellers who have substantial market power).
Exchanges could even create monopsonies to counteract the market power of the insurers
if all purchasers in one market joined the exchanges. While Enthoven thoroughly
described managed competition and the role of sponsors in correcting failures in health
insurance markets, his explanation of the economic theory behind their workings was
relatively superficial. Economic theory regarding bilateral oligopolies where a few
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buyers and a few sellers have substantial market power is not as well developed as theory
for perfect competition or where substantial asymmetries between sellers and buyers exist
(i.e., there is one monopoly, one oligopoly, or imperfect competition among sellers) and
can become complex and include bargaining or game theory. There is a growing interest,
however, in theories and studies on the countervailing power of large buyers to offset the
market power of existing, oligopolistic sellers. Although Enthoven did not discuss
countervailing power, sponsors bear a striking resemblance to the consolidation of buyers
which John Kenneth Galbraith believed would emerge to counteract the increasing
market power of sellers.
The term “countervailing power” was coined by Galbraith in 1952 in his book on
American Capitalism. Galbraith claims that American capitalism is no longer
characterized by competition in its classical form, but rather is mostly controlled by large
corporations which are able to exercise significant market power (Galbraith 1952, 109).
Galbraith disagrees with the classical belief that competition is a self-generating force as
the large profits derived by firms with market power inspire competition to obtain part of
those profits. Instead, he argues that barriers to entry into markets with large existing
firms are so great that competitors rarely enter those markets. A different self-generating
force, however, does appear to restrain the power of the large corporation in the place of
competition:
In fact, new restraints of private power did appear to replace competition. They
were nurtured by the same process of concentration which impaired or destroyed
competition. But they appear not on the same side of the market but on the
opposite side, not with competitors but with the customers or suppliers… I shall
cal it countervailing power. (Galbraith 1952, 111)
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Galbraith supports his theory of countervailing power by citing the abundance of
strong buyers in the majority of non-retail U.S. industries. Galbraith also distinguishes
his theory of countervailing power from bilateral monopoly, as countervailing power
allows buyers to create competition between small groups of sellers in an otherwise
uncompetitive market. This is one of sponsors’ essential roles in Enthoven’s model of
managed competition. Thus, the author discusses existing literature on market structure
and countervailing power to provide insights into the potential for sponsors (or health
insurance exchanges) to foster competition and correct market failures.
Empirical studies based on Galbraith’s theory of countervailing power in the
health care system have generally concentrated on the relationship between insurers as
the buyers and health care providers, particularly large hospitals, as the sellers of health
care. Several studies find that large insurers are able to extract discounts or lower prices
from providers. J.B. Herndon analyzes the interaction between managed care plans and
physician unions in the market for health care. She finds that the traditional monopsony
model (in which the monopsonists’ ability to extract lower prices decreases the quantity
of health care supplied by physicians) does not explain her observations of that market.
Instead, Herndon suggests an “all-or-none” model of monopsony to illustrate how
monopsony managed care plans are able to extract lower prices from physicians while
maintain the same quantity of care. As the sole purchasers in the model, monopsonies
are able to bargain with providers to reduce their prices for the same quantity of services.
They are able to do so because providers know that if they are unable to contract with a
monopsony, the monopsony can easily contract with a different group of providers.
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(Herndon 2002, 200). Although the all-or-none model is applied to a monosponistic
market, the model may be extended to oligopsonistic markets. If single buyers represent
a large enough portion of the market, they may force existing sellers to compete with
each other and decrease their prices rather than lose that volume of sales to another seller.
Similarly, Enthoven’s sponsors would change the rules of the game and act as
gatekeepers which allow insurers access to their market.
Other studies find empirical evidence that increased consolidation among health
insurers has allowed them to extract lower prices in concentrated hospital markets
(Moriya, Vogt and Gaynor 2010, and Melnick, Shen and Wu 2011). Gaynor, Moriya and
Vogt examine how insurer and hospital market concentration affect the prices of hospital
services using panel data spanning three years for transaction prices for health care
services for over 11 million Americans with private insurance. The authors use the
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) to measure industry concentration and find a
statistically significant correlation between increased insurer concentration and decreased
prices for hospital services. Interestingly, they find that increased hospital concentration
is not significantly correlated with increases in the prices for hospital services. This may
be because the hospital markets are already substantially concentrated. Melnick Shen
and Wu use two years of data on prices of hospital services and managed care
organizations (MCOs) covering 90% of the U.S. to examine the relationship between
concentration among hospitals and among MCOs. They find that, despite the increase
concentration among health insurers, more than 90% of hospitals still operate in markets
where hospital concentration exceeds health plan concentration. In markets with the
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greatest health plan concentration, however, hospital prices are approximately 12% lower
than in more competitive health plan markets (Melnick, Shen, Wu 2011, 1730-1731).
These studies on the interaction of insurers and providers with different levels of
market concentration indicate than an increase in buyer concentration can result in
decreased prices for goods without decreasing the quantity supplied. This accepts the
assumption that firms in more concentrated industries are able to reap larger than normal
profits. In increasing the market power of buyers, some of the benefits enjoyed by the
firms, in the form of excess profits, will be transferred to buyers, in the form of lower
prices for goods. Thus, since the health insurance industry is significantly more
concentrated than insurance purchasers, especially in the individual and small group
markets, research suggests that health exchanges could potentially provide purchasers
with substantial benefits through lowering premiums (prices). If exchanges are able to
extract premium decreases from insurers, this would have the additional benefit of
increasing access to care to those who are able to afford lower premiums.
Enthoven’s model of managed competition gives health insurance exchanges
(acting as “sponsors”) substantial powers and responsibilities to mitigate or correct other
market failures. As representatives of a large group of buyers, the market share of health
insurance exchanges would allow them to use their countervailing power to change the
rules of the health insurance market. To foster additional competition among health
insurers, exchanges would encourage and support efforts of new insurers to enter the
market. To foster competition among providers, exchanges would divide providers into
competing units rather than allowing them to contract with most plans in their area.
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Exchanges would also try to correct informational asymmetries by disseminating
information to consumers on health plan contracts, benefits, costs, quality and customer
satisfaction. They would select similar or standardized plans that would reduce the
degree of heterogeneity in health insurance products. This would facilitate comparison
shopping and limit adverse selection. To mitigate risk selection by insurers, exchanges
would ensure that health plans are able to accurately price the health care costs for
potential enrollees through appropriate risk rating and require continuity of coverage for
enrollees. Exchanges would also provide subsidies to lower costs sufficiently so that
individuals would be willing to pay for insurance rather instead of potentially needing a
“free ride” in the future.

The Affordable Care Act and Health Insurance Exchanges
After a year-long debate in Congress between several competing proposals,
President Barak Obama signed the first comprehensive national health care reform
legislation, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) on March 23, 2010
(Public Law 111–148). A week later, President Obama signed the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-152), which amended portions of
the ACA (and included some student loan reforms). To limit potential confusion, the
author refers to the amended health care reform law as the ACA.
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General Provisions
The ACA includes a variety of reforms affecting most areas of the health care
system, ranging from expansions of public programs to initiatives aimed at increasing the
health care workforce, especially for the provision of preventive and primary care. The
major areas of reform are summarized below: 7
•

An individual mandate requiring all U.S. citizens and legal residents to
have a minimum level of health insurance coverage or face a tax penalty
of “up to $695 per year to a maximum of three times that amount per
family or 2.5% of household income” that will be phased in through 2016
(Summary of New Health Reform Law 2011, 1).

•

Provision of premium credits and cost-sharing subsidies to low-income
individuals up to 400% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) on a sliding
scale.

•

A “play-or-pay” provision requiring employers with 50 or more full-time
employers to offer health insurance coverage or pay a fee. Provides
several levels of tax credits for small businesses with up to 25 employees
depending on their size.

•

Medicaid eligibility expansions (to be implemented by 2014) and
increased federal financial participation for the newly eligible.

•

Medicaid and Medicare payment reforms aimed at containing costs and
increasing compensation for the provision preventive and primary care.

•

Creation of various entities (federal, state, and non-profit) to research
strategies to improve health care provision, financing and health
outcomes.

•

Provision of grants for public demonstration projects or research regarding
health care innovations, particularly payment reforms, care coordination
and value-based purchasing.

7

The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation provides an excellent summary of the ACA reforms in greater
detail on its website at: http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8061.pdf.
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•

Requirement that states create health insurance exchanges through which
individuals and small-employers may purchase qualified coverage and
outlines the exchanges’ responsibilities. Establishment of a health
insurance Navigator to help customers “navigate” the new exchanges.

•

New regulations on insurers to protect consumers and decrease
administrative waste. Standardization of various regulations across the
individual and small-group health insurance markets, and the health
insurance exchanges.

•

A tax on insurers of employer-sponsored plans above a certain value, and
annual fees on pharmaceutical manufacturers and health insurers.

The reforms contained in the ACA affect both the public and private spheres of
the health care system by expanding public assistance and increasing regulations on
private insurers. They emphasize increased access to health insurance while attempting
to control costs through payment reforms. They support preventive and primary care and
greater coordination in the provision of health care. While the focus of this paper is on
health insurance exchanges, it is important to remember that the ACA contains a set of
provisions beyond those specific to the exchanges which also influence their success.
Thus, a more thorough explanation of these provisions, in addition to the health insurance
exchanges, is included in the following section.

State Health Insurance Exchanges
The ACA allows states significant flexibility in designing their own health
insurance exchanges, which has been maintained throughout subsequent guidance from
the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (the Secretary) on
their implementation.
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Establishing Health Insurance Exchanges and Operational Requirements
Section 1311 of the ACA provides grants to states to establish an American
Health Benefits Exchange (for individuals) and a Small Business Health Options
Program (SHOP Exchange) by January 1, 2014, and outlines most of their operational
and oversight requirements. States may choose between establishing their exchanges as a
new governmental entity, as part of an existing State agency, or as a separate non-profit
entity. They may also decide not to establish an exchange, in which case the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) will “work with the State” to establish an exchange
(Initial Guidance to States on Exchanges 2011). States may also merge their individual
and SHOP exchanges into one state exchange or collaborate to form regional or multistate exchanges. U.S. citizens and legal aliens (who are not incarcerated) not offered
qualified health insurance through their employers, or businesses with up to 100
employees may participate in the exchanges. States have the option to limit smallbusiness participation to those with up to 50 employees until 2016. Exclusions from the
individual mandate can be made based on financial hardship or religion.
Exchanges must facilitate the purchase of qualified health plans and ensure that
all offered plans meet certain requirements by:
•

Certifying and recertifying or decertifying offered plans to ensure they
meet certain criteria.

•

Operating a website to disseminate information and operating a toll-free
call center.

•

Providing information on public programs like Medicaid and the
Children’s Health Insurance Program and offered plans, including price
and quality ratings based on a standard methodology, benefit options,
actual costs of benefits after taking into account applicable tax credits and
cost sharing and in-network providers.
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•

Providing plan practice data and quality improvement activities specified
by the Secretary, such as “claims handling policies, financial disclosures,
enrollment and disenrollment data, claims denials, rating practices, cost
sharing for out of network coverage” (Initial Guidance to States on
Exchanges 2011).

•

Developing a single application for public medical assistance programs
and premium credits and cost-sharing subsidies which can be accessed
through a web-portal or submitted in person, by phone or by mail.

•

Engaging in significant outreach activities to reach potential enrollees and
organizing annual open enrollment periods. Once enrolled, performing a
customer satisfaction survey and publish the results.

•

Certifying if an individual is exempt from the individual mandate.

•

Providing data on its own operations, such as administrative expenditures,
etc.

•

Developing easily understandable, standardized formats to present the
different sets of information described.

Although the ACA includes many specific and detailed requirements, states are
given the greatest flexibility in one essential operational detail of their exchanges—the
level of involvement in plan selection. According to the Secretary’s guidance,
States have a range of options for how the Exchange operates from an “active
purchaser” model, in which the Exchange operates as large employers often do in
using market leverage and the tools of managed competition to negotiate product
offerings with insurers, to an “open marketplace” model, in which the Exchange
operates as a clearinghouse that is open to all qualified insurers and relies on
market forces to generate product offerings (Initial Guidance to States on
Exchanges 2011).
As states have begun planning their exchanges, the amount of flexibility allowed
has resulted in a variety of different operational structures. The decision between
creating an active purchaser or a clearinghouse is highly political and often contentious,
dividing public officials along bipartisan lines. The different arrangements that have
been enacted or planned by states are described in further detail in the following chapter.
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The Federal government has supported states through this process by providing grants to
48 states and the District of Columbia to begin planning their exchanges and will provide
additional grants to fund their actual establishment. Once operational, however, the
federal government will no longer provide funding to states and will expect the
exchanges to be self-funding (they may collect fees or otherwise generate funding for
their operation).

Health Insurance Products and Public Subsidies
The ACA includes various health insurance market reforms which effectively
standardize important regulations across the health insurance exchanges, the individual
health insurance market, and the small-group health insurance market. Although the
reforms described below cover major areas of differences between these markets, states
may decide to implement further regulations affecting the health insurance exchanges and
apply those also to the individual and small-group markets in their states. Section 1251
of the ACA phases in provisions that will require guarantee issue and renewability of new
health plans by 2014 by eliminating pre-existing conditions exclusions, annual and
lifetime limits on the dollar value of coverage. The ACA also requires health plans to
defend annual premium increases and gives states the authority to deny “unreasonable”
increases (as defined by HHS with input from states, the insurance industry and
consumers).
Section 1301 of the ACA specifies requirements for “qualified health plans”
which may be offered through the exchange: 1) they have been certified by the exchange;
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2) they provide the essential benefits package defined by states; 3) they are offered by a
health insurer licensed in the appropriate State; 4) the insurance company offers at least
one qualified health plan in the silver level and the gold level through the exchange; 5)
they charge the same premium rate for the same plan offered through the exchange and
an outside market; and 6) they comply with any other necessary regulations developed
after the passage of this legislation. Additionally, states must offer at least two multistate plans through each exchange, one of which must be offered by a non-profit entity
(Summary of New Health Reform Law 2011, 4).
According to the Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight,
“non-grandfathered plans in the individual and small group markets both inside and
outside of the Exchanges, Medicaid benchmark and benchmark-equivalent, and Basic
Health Programs must cover the EHB [Essential Health Benefits] beginning in 2014”
(Essential Health Benefits Bulletin 2011, 1). Self-insured health plans and plans
provided through the large group market are also exempt from this requirement. Similar
to many other provisions, the federal government has refrained from prescribing reform
details that states must follow. The ACA lists 10 categories of service which must be
covered in a state’s essential benefits package. Recent guidance from HHS recommends
four possible benchmark plans which are likely to cover the essential health benefits.
These include the largest insurance products (by enrollment) in the state’s small group
insurance market, offered to state employees, offered by the FEHB Plan, and offered by a
non-Medicaid HMO.

51

While all plans offered through the exchange must cover the essential health
benefits, states have the option to offer additional benefits, although these would not be
eligible for additional federal financing. In order to standardize the insurance market
while allowing a variety of choices, all newly offered insurance plans must fall within
four actuarial value levels, or offer only catastrophic coverage (for younger adults only).
A plan’s actuarial value is determined by the percent of expenses covered by a plan for a
standard population. Hence, a plan with a lower actuarial value would require greater
cost-sharing than a plan with a higher actuarial value. The following types of plans will
be available on January 1, 2014:
•

Bronze Plan - 60% actuarial value, with current Health Savings Account
(HSA) out-of-pocket limits (these were $5,950 for individuals and
$11,900 for families in 2010). This plan is the benchmark for minimum
creditable coverage tied to the individual mandate.

•

Silver Plan – 70% actuarial value, with current HSA out-of-pocket limits.

•

Gold Plan - 80% actuarial value, with current HSA out-of-pocket limits.

•

Platinum Plan - 90% actuarial value, with current HSA out-of-pocket
limits.

•

Catastrophic Plan – Available only to individuals up to age 30 or those
exempt from the individual mandate. Provides catastrophic coverage and
limited preventive and primary care (exempt from deductibles) at current
HSA coverage levels.

While plans must meet the specified actuarial standards, specific cost-sharing and
benefits structures may still vary between different plans since insurers may use a
combination of differed copayments, coinsurance and deductibles.
The ACA also includes provisions for premium credits and cost-sharing subsidies
for U.S. citizens and legal immigrants with family incomes up to 400% FPL. Premium
52

contributions are limited to certain percentages of income on a sliding scale such that
premium contributions for the lowest income group, up to 133% FPL, are capped at 2%
of income and for the highest income group, 300 - 400% FPL, are capped at 9.5% of
income. Cost-sharing is also subsidized, which effectively increases the actuarial value
of a plan. Table 1 below lists the available plan tiers and the effects of subsidies on the
actuarial value provided by plans.
Out-of-Pocket
Actuarial
Maximum
Value
Bronze
All individuals and small businesses HSA Level
60%
Silver
All individuals and small businesses HSA Level
70%
Silver
Incomes 300 – 400% FPL
2/3 HSA Level
70%
Silver
Incomes 250 – 300% FPL
1/2 HSA Level
70%
Silver
Incomes 200 – 250% FPL
1/2 HSA Level
73%
Gold
All individuals and small businesses HSA Level
80%
Gold
Incomes 150-200% FPL
1/3 HSA Level
85%
Platinum All individuals and small businesses HSA Level
90%
Platinum Incomes 100 – 150% FPL
1/3 HSA Level
94%
Table 1: Actuarial Values and Cost-Sharing Subsidies in the ACA from The Henry J.
Kaiser Family Foundation. Focus on Health Reform: What the Actuarial Values in the
Affordable Care Act Mean. April 2011.
Plan Tier

Applies to

The ACA also provides states with the option to create a “Basic Health Plan” for
uninsured individuals with family incomes between 133 – 200% FPL, who would
otherwise receive premium credits and cost-sharing subsidies through the exchange.
Basic Health Plans must offer the essential benefits package and may not impose greater
cost-sharing than a plan that would have included the credits and subsidies for that level
of income.
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Consumer Operated and Oriented Plans
Section 1322 of the ACA creates the Consumer Operated and Oriented Plan (COOP) program to “foster the creation of qualified nonprofit health insurance issuers to
offer qualified health plans in the individual and small group markets in the States in
which the issuers are licensed to offer such plans” (Public Law 111-148). In order to
receive federal grants and loans, these member-run CO-OPs must not be an existing
health insurer and must fulfill several requirements such as being independent from the
state or local governments, be held responsible to a majority vote of its members and use
its profits to lower premiums. As of March 29, 2012, a total of 10 non-profits offering
coverage in 10 states have been awarded $845,012,408 in low-interest loans (New Loan
Program Helps Create Customer-Driven Non-profit Health Insurers 2012).

Risk-Rating and Risk-Adjustment
Modified community rating of plans is allowed in the ACA but only on the basis
of age (limited to a 3 to 1 ratio), geographical area, family composition and tobacco use
(limited to a 1.5 to 1 ratio) (Summary of New Health Reform Law 2011, 5). This means
that insurers may increase premiums for older enrollees, but by no more than three times
the amount they charge the youngest enrollees. Similarly, insurers may increase
premiums for smokers to up to150% those of non-smokers.
Sections 1341 – 1343 outline the basic requirements for the implementation of the
reinsurance program, risk-corridors and a risk-adjustment program. The goal of these
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regulations is to better spread financial risk between insurers to mitigate incentives to
select healthier individuals. These programs are applied to all insurers in the relevant
markets and attempt to limit each insurer’s losses from insuring high-risk individuals and
gains from insuring lower-risk individuals. Final rules released by HHS in March 2012
provide states with substantial guidance for establishing these programs by January 1,
2014. The reinsurance program is intended to operate between 2014 and 2016, although
it may continue operating thereafter if available funds remain. Similar to existing
reinsurance, the ACA reinsurance program is an insurance policy for insurers in
individual markets inside and outside the exchange to protect them from specific-high
cost individuals. States have the option to establish their own reinsurance program.
Otherwise, HHS will administer reinsurance, even if the state is operating its exchange.
The program will collect contributions from all insurers on a per capita basis. States have
the option to collect contributions from self-insured plans, large group health plans and
fully insured plans. Insurers providing non-grandfathered individual policies inside and
outside of the exchange will receive reinsurance recoveries for claims paid on behalf of
high-risk individuals for any service covered by the plan, even if these are beyond the
essential health benefits.
The risk corridors will be administered by HHS between 2014 and 2016 and
apply to all qualified health plans offered through the exchange, and may include
qualified health plans offered outside the exchange if these are substantially similar. The
risk corridor program will apply at the benefit plan level, and attempt to limit insurers’
gains or losses through the exchange within a certain range or “corridor” (Winkelman et.
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al. 2012, 2). Through the program, the benefit costs (not including administrative costs)
will be compared to a “target amount” of the earned premiums (also excluding
administrative costs) for a plan year. The costs must fall within a 3% range above or
below the target amount. If plans pay over 103% of the target amount, HHS pays plans
for the additional claims. Conversely, if a plan pays under 97% of the target amount in
claims, the plan pays HHS the difference (Merlis, 2011).
States have the option to administer their own risk adjustment programs if they
have established an approved exchange, or allow HHS to administer the program. The
ACA also allows states to develop their own methodology for calculating the transferred
payments, although HHS will publish their official methodology, which states may adopt.
The risk adjustment program will apply to all non-grandfathered in plans in the individual
and small-group markets. Following a methodology based on a plan’s average risk score
across all enrollees, risk adjustment programs will make transfers from plans with
relatively low-risk populations to plans with relatively high-risk populations. Successful
risk adjustment programs will be able to mitigate risk selection by ensuring that plans’
are adequately compensated relative to the “riskiness” of their enrollees. Unlike
reinsurance and the risk corridors, the risk adjustment program is not a temporary
program, but is intended to operate in conjunction with the exchanges to mitigate adverse
selection and ensure the financial viability of the exchange and individual and smallgroup markets.
The reinsurance, risk corridors and risk adjustment programs established in the
ACA must account for new medical loss ratio requirements. The medical loss ratio is
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generally calculated as the ratio of claims expenditures to a plan’s earned premiums.
Thus, higher medical loss ratios demonstrate that a higher portion of premiums paid by
enrollees are being use to fund their care. Conversely, lower medical loss ratios can
indicate high administrative costs or profits which the insurer is not using to fund health
care for its enrollees. States currently have a range of medical loss ratio requirements
imposed on health insurance markets. The ACA would change the traditional calculation
to add quality improvement expenses in the claims expenditures in the numerator and
remove taxes, licensing and regulatory fees from the earned premiums in the
denominator.8 Insurers with the highest number of enrollees must meet minimum
medical loss ratios of 80% for the individual and small group markets and 85% for the
large group market. Insurers with fewer enrollees are allowed lower medical loss ratios
and those with the smallest number of enrollees (less than 1,000 life years) are presumed
to meet the ACA medical loss requirements (Explaining Health Care Reform: Medical
Loss Ratio (MLR) 2012, 3). These requirements are intended to limit excessive profits
for insurers and incentivize administrative efficiency while acknowledging limitations to
small insurers who would otherwise be at a disadvantage in lowering their overhead
costs.

Economic Benefits and Potential Problems for Health Insurance Exchanges
State health insurance exchanges, combined with reforms in the ACA, are
intended to change the “rules of the game” which have prevented a portion of the
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population from accessing affordable health insurance and obtaining necessary health
care. Or, as Nichols states, “enable all Americans to have access to the same economies
of scale, product choice, and risk pooling that workers in large firms have” (Nichols
2010, 1154). The overall success of the exchanges in improving access and lowering
costs will depend on a variety of factors. The individual mandate, which is currently
being debated by the U.S. Supreme Court, and public subsidies, will have the greatest
effect on access to insurance, as well as the average cost of insurance for enrollees.
Specific state design choices, between an “active purchaser” and a “clearinghouse,”
separating or merging the individual and small group exchanges, and the size of small
businesses allowed to participate, will influence premiums, costs and access. Exchanges’
success in risk pooling and managing risk between insurers will determine whether they
can substantially mitigate adverse selection to improve the insurance environment for
individuals and small groups. Finally, exchanges must operate efficiently in carrying out
the substantial administrative tasks designated to them by the ACA and ensure that they
are providing value to their enrollees.

Individual Mandate and Public Subsidies
In March 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments for a lawsuit put forth
by the State of Florida, and supported by 25 states, disputing the constitutionality of the
individual mandate (as well as Medicaid expansions) in the ACA. The Supreme Court is
expected to provide its opinion by June 2012. If the individual mandate is struck down as
unconstitutional, but deemed “severable” from the remainder of the ACA, it is
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questionable whether state exchanges will succeed in substantially increasing access to
health insurance. The individual mandate will essentially maximize potential enrollment
in the exchanges and the size of their risk pools. It will also “do more to reduce adverse
selection than any of the other strategies” (The New York State Health Policy Research
Center 2009, 9). By mandating that everyone purchase insurance, relatively healthier
individuals with lower costs must enter the market, thereby making the overall insured
population “healthier” and decreasing the average cost of insuring enrollees. Most health
care researchers agree that exchanges have historically attracted less healthy enrollees
than the market at large (Jost 2012, 270). Without the individual mandate, it is unlikely
that currently uninsured and relatively healthier individuals will purchase insurance,
unless the remaining ACA reforms are able to decrease their premiums substantially.
The exchanges, and the ACA as a whole, could become less than half as effective at
decreasing uninsurance without the individual mandate (Buettgens and Carroll 2012, 3).
To make mandated insurance affordable, the ACA also includes substantial
premium credits, cost-sharing subsidies and out-of-pocket limits for low-income
individuals, and provides tax credits for small employers. Medicaid expansions will also
increase the number of people eligible for public benefits. As a result, low income
individuals with family incomes up to 400% FPL, not eligible for Medicaid or CHIP, will
benefit substantially from the credits and subsidies provided through the exchanges.
Without this public financing, many of them would remain uninsured. At the same time,
individuals with higher incomes who would rather pay a penalty, which is capped at 2.5%
of household income, may remain uninsured. Middle-income families above 400% FPL,
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however, may have difficulty paying for mandated insurance, especially if the exchanges
are unable to contain premium growth. This could create perverse incentives for
individuals and families to remain below the 400% FPL threshold for public financial
assistance. In addition, the requirement that employers with 50 or more employees
provide health insurance to full-time employees to avoid paying a penalty, could also
steer employers towards converting full-time employees to part-time employees or
contractors (Richardson 2009, 345 and Tully 2010). This would benefit employers and
low-income employees as employers would be exempt from providing health insurance
benefits, and employees would be more likely to qualify for public credits and subsidies.
The resulting shift of health care expenditures from private payers to the public
sector, however, could pose problems for the federal government, which is already facing
an enormous budget deficit and increased pressure to reduce its spending. Moreover,
families benefiting from credits and subsidies will be financially removed from their
health care costs. This could lead to additional utilization and greater health care
expenditures in the system. Some argue, however, that insensitivity to health care costs
does not necessarily result in increased utilization as visiting the doctor or going to the
hospital are not experiences most people would undergo unless necessary.

Exchange Design
One of the most critical design features of the health insurance exchanges is also one of
the most politically charged decisions facing states—the level of involvement in selecting
the plans offered through the exchanges. States which would like to create an exchange
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with the potential use its market leverage to bargain with insurers on the basis of prices
and quality may design them to act as “active purchasers.” Some of these may also use a
competitive bidding process to select plans offered through the exchange. On the other
hand, states which would like to limit the powers of their exchange and leave plan
selection to the “modified” insurance market may create a “clearinghouse” which will
offer any willing qualified plan. As stated in previous sections, theory and empirical
evidence suggests that an exchange that enrolls a substantial number of individuals and
small groups to capture a large share of the market could extract lower premiums from
insurers.
Although the creation of an “active purchaser” would likely result in lower
premiums for enrollees, it is difficult to predict whether, or how, these lower premiums
will be transferred to providers. If insurers must lower their premiums, they may attempt
to transfer the loss in premiums to providers by lowering their compensation, or
attempting to control utilization, which could negatively impact the provision and the
quality of health care. The provision and quality of health care from providers may not
be negatively impacted if the decrease in their compensation does not go below their
costs. Thus, the ability of active purchasers to decrease premiums without adverse
effects on other actors in their supply-chain will depend on whether insurers and
providers (and other health care products or equipment providers) have excess profits. If
this is the case, exchanges could exercise their market power to transfer these profits to
consumers through lower prices. If states design exchanges to function as
clearinghouses, the ACA’s new regulations may still foster sufficient competition among
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insurers to benefit enrollees. Exchanges will offer enrollees more plan choices and
provide standardized, understandable information on offered plans which will facilitate
comparison shopping.
Plan choices and premiums will also depend on whether states decide to maintain
separate individual and group exchanges (and risk pools) or merge these to provide plans
through one exchange with one risk pool. Maintaining separate exchanges and separate
risk pools would maintain the difference in premiums between the two markets. The
level of premiums in this scenario is dependent on the exchanges’ ability to increase its
enrollment to healthier consumers. Simply merging the pools, in conjunction with the
ACA’s other insurance reforms like modified community rating and guarantee issue,
however, will likely decrease average premiums in the individual market significantly.
Since the individual market generally suffers from adverse selection and attracts the most
medically-needy and high-cost individuals, premiums tend to be higher in this market
compared to other markets, including the small group market. Thus, merging the two
markets and limiting experience rating of premiums would decrease the average premium
for the high-cost individuals in the market. It is unclear whether premiums will fall
substantially for small groups, and the larger of these may actually see their premiums
rise, although by less than the premium decreases for individuals (Lischko and
Manzolillo 2010, 3).
Allowing small businesses with up to 100 employees, rather than just those with
up to 50 employees, to provide insurance through the exchange would also increase the
size of the exchange’s risk pool. This could potentially decrease average premiums if the
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additional businesses include relatively healthier employees. Allowing more enrollees
would also make exchanges more attractive for health insurers and provide “active
purchaser” exchanges additional bargaining power if they are able to capture a larger
share of the market.

Risk Management
The ACA provides three main mechanisms for exchanges and the federal
government to manage risk among insurers. Since the federally-run risk corridor and the
reinsurance programs are temporary, the risk adjustment program will become the main
mechanism for states to mitigate adverse selection. The ACA allows states to include all
individual and small group plans offered within and outside of the exchange in their risk
adjustment program, but excludes self-insured plans and plans grandfathered into the new
system. Most grandfathered plans will be offered by large employers, while a smaller
portion will be provided through the small group market.
Risk adjustment programs will compensate plans with disproportionately sicker
enrollees while preventing plans with disproportionately healthier enrollees from reaping
excessive benefits, thereby minimizing incentives for risk selection by plans. Risk
adjustment programs will also have to mitigate any “sliced” risk selection arising if
relatively healthier enrollees gravitate towards less expensive plans (i.e., Catastrophic
Plans, or Bronze or Silver Plans) (Jost 2012, 270). Successful risk adjustment programs
will stabilize average premiums at a lower rate than what is available currently in the
individual and small group markets. Requirements that the insurers charge the same
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premiums for the same plans inside and outside the exchange and the uniform application
of insurance regulations will also mitigate adverse selection. The exclusion of
grandfathered-in plans and self-insured plans from risk adjustment programs, as well as
several new ACA regulations may provide incentives for small businesses to self-insure.
Since it is less expensive for businesses with relatively healthier employees to self-insure
compared to businesses with relatively sicker employees, there is still potential for
adverse selection.

Operations and Administration
Health insurance exchanges will be required to perform a variety of tasks ranging
from information collection and dissemination, to enrollment in the exchange, Medicaid
and CHIP, to the administration of subsidies, to premiums collections for small groups.
Thus, while exchanges will assume many administrative functions for individuals and
small groups with the potential for economies of scale, they will also be incurring costs of
their own. The magnitude of the services exchanges must provide could result in an
extremely large organization with increased opportunities for waste and unnecessary
bureaucracy. States or their non-profit designees will be challenged to create systems to
operate their exchanges efficiently and smoothly. Most exchanges are expecting to begin
charging fees in 2015 when they will no longer receive federal funding for their
operations and must become self-sustaining. Since the federal and state governments are
unlikely to decide to charge fees to enrollees, they will probably charge fees to insurers to
participate in the exchanges. In turn, insurers may pass these fees along to enrollees
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through premiums. Thus, exchanges must ensure that they provide valuable services to
their enrollees. While individuals will easily benefit from using exchanges, small
businesses, which have the option to self-insure and avoid tedious regulations, must
receive substantial value from the exchanges to compensate for the additional
administrative burden of complying with exchange regulations and the potential passing
along of the exchanges’ administrative fees. States must make sure to avoid
diseconomies of small scale which have plagued smaller insurers and contributed to
insurance industry consolidation. The ACA does provide states the option of creating
regional exchanges that could substantially mitigate potential diseconomies of small
scale. Regional exchanges would have the ability to enroll a greater number of
individuals and small groups, thereby allowing them to lower their average administrative
or overhead costs per enrollee compared to a single state exchange.

65

IMPLEMENTATION OF HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES

Anticipated Outcomes
In projecting the effects of the ACA reforms, particularly the health insurance
exchanges, many researchers have focused on microsimulation models. Through these
models they simulate the behavior of various agents (i.e., businesses and families) in
response to the ACA to project the potential outcomes of the reform. As described
above, the ACA gives states a great deal of flexibility in the implementation of their
exchange. It is impractical to study the effectiveness of state exchanges outside of the
context of the other ACA reforms and most researchers examine the ACA as a whole.
Thus, models also account for the other ACA reforms that support the functions of the
exchange. In this section, several of these models will be examined to compare three
different scenarios representing possible variations in state exchanges. First, models
simulating the implementation of existing ACA reforms will be examined to determine
whether the legislation may achieve its intended goal. Second, models simulating
implementation of the ACA reforms without the individual mandate will be examined
since the U.S. Supreme court may still strike that part of the ACA. A third scenario,
involving the implementation of a single-payer system, which at least one state is
planning on implementing, will also be examined as a point of comparison. All of the
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models focus on nonelderly populations and exclude the Medicare-eligible populations
over 64 years of age from their analyses.

Implementing the Existing ACA Reform
Eibner et al. of the RAND Corporation use a microsimulation developed at
RAND, the Comprehensive Assessment of Reform Efforts (COMPARE) model to
simulate health insurance coverage and health care costs for businesses offering
insurance inside and outside the exchange. They run multiple simulations varying
different assumptions reflecting states’ design differences to estimate their potential
effects. They use data from a variety of sources to piece together a synthetic population
reflecting the characteristics of the national population and businesses. These data
include, the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2001 Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP) Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, the Household Component (MEPS-HC) from
2002 and 2003, the 2006 Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Educational
Trust Employer Health Benefits Annual Survey (Kaiser/HRET). All data was modified
to reflect projected population characteristics for 2010 and 2019. Due to sample-size
limitations, Eibner et al. modeled one national exchange, rather than individual state
exchanges. Thus, the results of their simulations will be more indicative of outcomes in
large states with characteristics similar to the nation as a whole, than in small states with
unique characteristics.
The COMPARE model uses utility maximization functions to simulate
individuals’ and businesses’ decisions. Individuals’ behavior is determined by their
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eligibility for the expanded Medicaid program and the utility associated with being
uninsured and obtaining different types of insurance (a standardized employer-sponsored
plan and each of the plan tiers offered through the exchange). Individuals’ utility is a
function of their out-of-pocket health expenditures, premiums, their level of risk aversion
and the utility associated with consuming health care services. Firm behavior is modeled
using a utility function based on aggregate worker utility, the weight firms place that
utility and the cost of offering insurance. The model assumes that firms that do not offer
insurance will pass a fraction of the costs of insurance back to their employees through
higher wages and that some employees may prefer higher wages rather than employersponsored insurance. If a large number of employees qualify for Medicaid or premium
and cost-sharing subsidies through the exchange, employers may decide against offering
insurance. The model produces price elasticities ranging from -.54 for firms with 10 or
fewer employees to -.07 for firms with more than 100 employees, which are well within
the range reported in previous studies (Eibner et al. 2010, 13). According to this model,
even small firms are not very sensitive to price as their demand is relatively inelastic.
Eibner et al. include the main provisions of the ACA in their model. However,
they make some assumptions that other modelers do not. They do not account for the
possibility of remaining individual grandfathered in plans and assume the traditional
individual market for health insurance disappears. They assume that employer
contribution rates remain at the current level and allow firms to offer only one plan. In
their first simulation, they model the status quo in 2016 by projecting population and
business characteristics and health care costs and insurance coverage under existing
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regulations. In their second simulation, which they call their “baseline” simulation,
Eibner et al. model an exchange that allows employers with 100 or fewer employees to
participate, combines the individual and small group markets in the exchange, includes
the employer and individual mandate penalties but excludes the tax credit for small
businesses, and assumes exchanges will have administrative costs equaling 12% of plan
premiums.
Eibner et al. find that the uninsurance rate would drop from 19% in the status quo
scenario to 6% in the baseline scenario, with 26% of those insured obtaining coverage
through the exchange (Eibner et al. 2010, 20). The share of employers offering health
insurance would increase from 59% to 81% of all employers so that the percent of
workers in firms offering insurance would increase from 85% to 95% (Eibner et al. 2010,
18). Of workers with health insurance, 75% would be offered traditional employersponsored insurance outside of the exchange. Although 13% of previously offering firms
would no longer do so in the baseline model, no firms with over 50 employees would
drop coverage. Premiums for employer-sponsored, single coverage would decrease
slightly in the baseline scenario. At the same time, the premiums for all plans offered
through the exchange in the baseline model would be lower than the estimated individual
premium under the status quo. The most expensive plan, the Platinum plan, is estimated
to have an annual premium of $6,000 compared to the status quo estimate of the average
premium for individual plans of $6,086 (in 2010 dollars) (Eibner et al. 2010, 22). This
supports existing theory that merging the individual and small group markets would
decrease premiums for individuals. At the same time, the model predicts that the Bronze,
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Silver and Gold plans in the merged markets would also be cheaper than the estimated
employer-sponsored plan in the baseline scenario since these have a lower actuarial value
than the existing employer-sponsored plans (Eibner et al. 2010, 22).
The COMPARE model also predicts that aggregate employer spending would
only decrease by 2% from the status quo to the baseline scenario (from $722 billion to
$705 billion in 2010 dollars) (Eibner et al. 2010, 23). This is mostly due to firms
switching to plans with lower actuarial values, although some employers drop insurance
coverage. The model also predicts that government spending would increase by $123
billion per year under the baseline scenario (Eibner et al. 2010, 24). This accounts for
premium and cost-sharing subsidies, Medicaid expansions and the individual and
employer mandate penalties. This does not take into account new taxes and fees imposed
on insurers.
Eibner et al. also model a scenario in which any business may offer insurance
through the exchange. In this scenario, total enrollment in the exchange more than
doubles, and the number enrolled through their employer in the exchange almost triples.
At the same time, employers offer more lower-actuarial value plans, making Medicaid
more attractive to eligible workers and decreasing aggregate employer expenditures to
$608 billion (in 2010 dollars) (Eibner et al. 2010, 29). This could be indicative of an
increase the number of underinsured persons since the lower-actuarial value plans may
not offer sufficient coverage for some individuals.
In another scenario, Eibner et al. model the effects of separate individual and
small group risk pools in the exchange. This model predicts that insurance coverage
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would shift from the individual market in the exchange to small group coverage in the
exchange yet not alter the total number of insured. Since people enrolled in exchanges as
individuals tend to be less healthy than those whose employers offer insurance through
the exchange, the premiums for the individuals are about 40% higher than those in the
small group market under this scenario. The number of insured persons remains the same
despite the rise in individual market premiums because government subsidies would limit
the portion of increased costs passed on to individuals. Thus, government spending
under this scenario would increase by $10 billion due to increased subsidies (Eibner et al.
2010, 31).
Eibner et al. model additional scenarios that have a minimal effect of the overall
outcomes the ACA. The employer penalties and small employer tax credits do not
significantly increase the number of people insured since employers already have high
offer rates under the baseline simulation. This suggests that employers value their
employees’ preferences above the costs of offering insurance. This may be related to the
existing association between employment and insurance coverage and employers’ desire
to be seen regarded in a positive light. Since the model does contain a parameter that
directly affects the weight employers give to employee preferences, however, this may
just be the result of the magnitude of that parameter. Additional simulations model the
effects of changes in the exchange’s administrative costs to 8% and 18% of premiums.
The effect on exchange enrollment is relatively small in these simulations, suggesting
that varying administrative costs within a “reasonable range” does not significantly alter
the effects of the ACA (Eibner et al. 2010, 30). Eibner et al. also examine the effect of
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one final variable, inertia, or “bias toward the status quo in decision making” on
exchange enrollment. This variable is difficult to anticipate and quantify since
preferences towards maintaining the status quo or a dislike of change are not well
explained in economic theory. Research suggests, however, that inertia is a common
phenomenon which would decrease enrollment in exchanges to a level below its potential
(Eibner et al 2010, 31).
Buettgens, Bowen and Holahan of the Urban Institute use a similar model, the
Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model (HIPSM) to simulate the ACA as if fully
implemented in 2010. They compare the results of that simulation to a simulation of the
pre-reform environment. The HIPSM model uses many data sources, including the
March 2009 and 2010 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic
Supplement (ASEC), the February 2005 CPS Contingent Work and Alternative
Employment Supplement , 2006-2008 pooled MEPS-HC data sets, the 2010
Kaiser/HRET and America’s Health Insurance Plan (AHIP) surveys and Congressional
Budget Office data and National Health Expenditure Accounts. Similar to Eibner et al.,
Buettgens, Bowen and Holahan use this data to create a synthetic population with current
U.S. population and business characteristics which they model using one exchange. They
also use the Massachusetts Health Insurance Survey to build parameters for individual
behavioral effects under the individual mandate. HIPSM uses a utility-based framework
similar to that of the COMPARE model. Individuals’ utility depends on disposable
income, out-of-pocket health care spending, health care spending paid by insurers, the
government or uncompensated care and level of relative risk aversion. It also attempts to
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capture family preferences like aversion to public program participation and
sociodemographic characteristics (Urban Institute, 6). Employers’ utility is a function of
whether they anticipate the employees’ aggregate utility from insurance offers to exceed
the cost of offering and the number of employees who gain value from being offered
insurance. The range of price elasticities of firms is greater in HIPSM than in the
COMPARE model. Firms with fewer than 10 employees experience a price elasticity of
-1.16 while firms with 500 to 1000 employees experience a price elasticity of -.047
(Urban Institute, 18). Hence in this model, smaller firms are much more sensitive to
insurance price increases as a 1% increase in price would result in a proportionately
larger decrease in demand of 1.16%. At the same time, large firms are generally
insensitive to price increases.
Buettgens, Bowen and Holahan model most of the ACA provisions but make
some assumptions that are different from other models. They assume that administrative
costs are increase to 20%, the ACA limit under the reform yet remain at15% without the
reform. They also allow employers with up to 100 employees to participate in the
exchange, separate the individual and small group risk pools in the exchange and
maintain the traditional individual market outside of the exchange. The model also
simulates behavior under the individual mandate, which is based on the applicable
financial penalty, additional disutility of non-compliance (resulting from a desire to
comply with the law or avoid enforcement) and a small spill-over effect that results in
increase insurance coverage for individuals exempt from the mandate (Urban Institute,
18).
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Using HIPSM, Buettgens, Bowen and Holahan find that the uninsurance rate
decreases from 18.6% to 8.3% with the implementation of the ACA and that 17.8% of
those insured individuals would obtain coverage through the exchange. 9 The percentage
of the population covered by employer-sponsored insurance outside of the exchange
decreases from 56.6% to 48.7% with the reform. Individual coverage outside of
exchange drops from 5.5% to 1.2% of population, while coverage through the exchange
increases to 8.7% (Buettgens, Bowen and Holahan 2010, 4). Although their model does
maintain an individual market outside of the exchange, Buettgens, Bowen and Holahan
observe that it may be difficult for insurers in this market to differentiate themselves,
especially since subsidies are only available through the exchange. If they fail to do so,
the individual market outside of the exchange may disappear entirely.
Interestingly, the model predicts that 41% of the individuals who would be
uninsured without the reform would remain uninsured once the ACA is implemented;
38% of the remaining uninsured would be eligible for Medicaid or CHIP but not enroll,
26% would be undocumented immigrants unable to participate in the exchange and not
subject to the individual mandate, 8% would meet affordability exemption requirements
and 28% would be subject to the individual mandate, yet refuse to comply or pay the
penalties (Buettgens, Bowen and Holahan 2010, 5). This suggests that even under the
best circumstances in which exchanges function optimally and the ACA’s other
regulations are well implemented, a number of people would remain uninsured
voluntarily or remain excluded from the system.
9

Calculations based on simulation results in Buettgens, Bowen and Holahan’s “America Under the
Affordable Care Act,” Table 1: Health Insurance Coverage Distribution of the Nonelderly in Baseline and
Reform.
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Under the ACA reforms, Buettgens, Bowen and Holahan estimate that
government spending would increase by $69 billion if the ACA were fully implemented
in 2010 (Buettgens, Bowen and Holahan 2010, 6). This accounts for premiums and costsharing subsidies, employer subsidies and individual and employer mandate penalties.
This does not take into account additional revenues from new taxes and fees or any
savings from Medicare or Medicaid reforms and cost-control provisions. The net effect
of the reform on aggregate employer spending is less than 1%. Aggregate individual
spending would increase due to an increase in insurance coverage and individual mandate
penalties. While spending for individuals with family incomes below 200% FPL would
decrease by 12.5% due to public subsidies, spending for those between 200 and 399%
FPL would increase by 12.5% and spending for at or over 400% FPL would increase by
16.3% (Buettgens, Bowen and Holahan 2010, 6).
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has modeled the effects of the ACA
multiple times since the legislation was introduced and has recently updated these
estimates. The CBO’s Health Insurance Simulation Model (HISM) works similarly to
the COMPARE model and HIPSM to project individual and business behaviors of a
synthetic population mirroring the U.S. population. The CBO uses data from the May
2002 SIPP, the 2004 Medicaid Expenditure Panel Survey Insurance Component (MEPSIC), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) National Compensation Survey, the 2000
National Health Expenditure Accounts, the Actuarial Research Corporation, and the
National Bureau of Economic Research’s tax simulation model, TAXISM. Unlike the
COMPARE model and HIPSM, HISM uses an elasticity-based approach to estimate
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behavioral changes based on past experience and computes premiums exogenously based
on certain factors (age and sex, health status, the prior year’s spending, geographic
variation and a base used to convert the previous factors into dollars) (Congressional
Budget Office 2007, 8). Firms’ expenditures are estimated based on employees’
spending and modified to account for premium loading costs, state premium regulations
and the relative value of plans. The model allows employer contributions to vary based
on firm-level data. The CBO’s model assumes that the ACA will be fully implemented
in 2016.
Based on existing literature, the average elasticity of relative plan value for
individuals is -.35% which is considered to be relatively inelastic (Congressional Budget
Office 2007, 16). The model modifies this elasticity so that individuals with lower
incomes will have larger elasticities than those with higher incomes. The price elasticity
for employers of offering insurance in this model is similar to the elasticities in the
HIPSM model. They range from -1.14 for businesses with fewer than 25 employees to 0
for businesses with over 1000 employees (Congressional Budget Office 2007, 18).
Specific assumptions used in the CBO’s model such as the size of firms allowed to
participate in the exchange, or whether the small group and individual risk pools are
combined are not made explicit in the CBO’s public documents. Since the CBO’s
estimates are often used as a benchmark for other models of legislation, some of the main
results are included in this section.
The CBO’s estimates also provide a different perspective compared to the other
models discussed because they focus on cumulative effects over ten years, and the
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projected impact on the federal budget. In January 2011, they estimated that the reform
would decrease the federal deficit by $210 billion over 2012-2021 (Elmendorf 2011, 3).
This includes projected increases in federal spending due to Medicaid expansions,
premium and cost-sharing subsidies, small business tax credits and administrative costs to
federal agencies. The projection also includes sources of decreased federal spending
such as provisions directed at reducing costs in federal programs, and sources of
increased federal revenues from mandate penalties and new taxes and fees. In March
2012, the CBO and Joint Committee on Taxation (JTC) released “Updated Estimates for
the Insurance Coverage Provisions of the Affordable Care Act.” Their estimates build on
their March 2011 estimates and incorporate new legislation, a more conservative
economic forecast and updated projections of health insurance premiums. They estimate
that the net cost of the insurance provisions of the ACA would be just under $1.1 trillion
over 2012-2021, which is $50 billion lower than their previous estimates (Congressional
Budget Office 2012, 1). They project that the uninsurance rate in 2016 would be 9% with
the implementation of the ACA and 20% without the reform. At the same time the
percentage of the population with employer-offered insurance would drop by 2%, while
exchanges would cover 7% of the population. At the same time, Medicaid and CHIP
enrollment would increase from 12% to 18% of the population. 10
Although the specifications of the RAND, Urban Institute and CBO models
differ, they arrive at similar results which agree with theoretical predictions. They all
estimate that the uninsurance rate would decrease by almost half with the implementation

10

Calculations based on CBO’s data in its March 2012 “Updated Estimates for the Insurance Coverage
Provisions of the Affordable Care Act,” Table 3.
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of existing ACA reforms, to levels between 8% and 11% of the population. Although
this is a significant decrease in uninsurance, there are still a number of people uninsured.
Almost a third of those uninsured are undocumented immigrants who cannot participate
in the exchanges. Many argue that undocumented immigrants should be allowed to
participate, and doing so would increase the potential population enrolled in exchanges.
According to Buettgens, Garrett and Holahan, two thirds of the individuals still uninsured
after the implementation of ACA would be eligible for Medicaid or CHIP or subject to
the individual mandate. At the same time, Eibner et al. discuss the possibility that
businesses and individuals may not take advantage of ACA regulations due to a
preference for the status quo or an aversion to change (or the ACA itself). As a matter of
fact, the CBO’s March 2012 estimates of the impact of the ACA included a decrease in
expenditures for small business tax credits to account for lower than anticipated
preliminary tax data (Congressional Budget Office 2012, 8). Both of these factors are
difficult to predict and measure, but could substantially decrease the benefits of state
exchanges and the ACA and increase the potential for adverse selection, especially in
smaller states. These models also demonstrate that enrollment and premiums in state
health exchanges could vary substantially based on their design choices. In particular,
the decision to combine or maintain separate individual and small group markets in the
exchange could result in great variation. It is interesting to note that none of these
models examine states’ choice to design their exchange as an active purchaser or
clearinghouse. This may be due to the difficulties in modeling bargaining power in
concentrated markets that is discussed in prior sections.
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Eliminating the Individual Mandate
One of the most, if not the single most, controversial provision in the ACA is the
individual mandate. This provision requires almost all legal residents of the U.S. to
purchase a minimum health insurance package or face financial penalties. Theoretical
discussions in previous sections of this paper indicate that this provision could be a
determining factor in the overall success of health exchanges and the ACA as a whole.
There is a possibility that the Supreme Court may decide to strike the individual mandate
provision in the ACA. If this is the case, they will also decide whether the provision is
essential for the remaining reforms’ success or if it can be severed from them. Many
researchers have attempted to answer this question by simulating what would happen if
the ACA were implemented without the individual mandate. Some of those analyses are
discussed in this section, including some using the models discussed in the previous
section, as well as an additional model by Jonathan Gruber.
Eibner and Price of the Rand Corporation examine the effects of the ACA with
and without an individual mandate. The use the COMPARE model described earlier to
complete this analysis of the projected effects in 2016, when they assume the ACA will
be fully implemented. They maintain separate small business and individual risk pools
for the exchange and only model a market for large, grandfathered in plans outside of the
exchange. They model a first scenario estimating the effect of the individual mandate by
increasing the cost (or disutility) of uninsurance by the penalty amount. In a second
model, they project the effects of the ACA without an individual mandate. They find that
the uninsurance rate under the ACA would increase from 8.8% to 13.4% of the
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population without the mandate.11 Although the provision of insurance through all
sources would decrease (i.e., Medicaid, Exchanges, employer-sponsored, etc.), the
majority of the decrease would occur in the exchange. This is not unreasonable since the
majority of increases in enrollment under the current ACA legislation would occur in the
exchange as this would be the main option for coverage for the previously uninsured who
do not qualify for Medicaid or CHIP.
The COMPARE model used by Eibner and Price predicts that the average
premiums for individual exchange plans without the individual mandate would rise by
approximately 9.3% (Eibner and Price 2012, 6). Eibner and Price, however, estimate that
the majority of this increase is due to variation in age composition of enrollees due to the
elimination of the individual mandate. Without the individual mandate, fewer relatively
healthy enrollees would purchase coverage under the ACA’s modified community rating,
so the remaining enrollees would be relatively less healthy. When the premiums without
the individual mandate are adjusted for age, the average premiums increase by only 2.4%
(Eibner and Price 2012, 7). Although this increase is statistically significant, Eibner and
Price believe its effect would be relatively small (about $140 annual increase for the
individual silver plan) (Eibner and Price 2012, 7). Eibner and Price conclude that, due to
other ACA reforms, particularly premium and cost-sharing subsidies, eliminating the
individual mandate would not necessarily lead to an adverse selection problem that would
destabilize exchanges.
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Calculations based on date in Eibner and Price’s 2012 “The Effect of the Affordable Care Act on
Enrollment and Premiums, With and Without the Individual Mandate,” Tables 1 and 2.
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Their conclusion may be the result of maintaining separate individual and small
group markets in the exchange. This allows insurers to charge different premiums for
each market that reflect the relative differences in each populations’ health (individual
market enrollees are generally relatively less healthy than small group market enrollees).
Since enrollment in the individual market would decrease much more than enrollment in
the small group market in the absence of the individual mandate, premiums in the
individual market are also affected more than premiums in the small group market. If the
two markets were combined, however, the decreased enrollment of relatively healthier
individuals would affect individual as well as small group premiums in the merged
market. To the extent that price-sensitive small groups would exit the exchange as a
result of the premiums increase, premiums would increase further, leading to additional
individuals and small businesses leaving the exchange.
Although Eibner and Price project that eliminating the individual mandate would
have a relatively small effect on individual market premiums, this is mostly at the
expense of the federal government. Since the individual mandate does not affect the
provision of premium and cost-sharing subsidies, the number of individuals eligible for
these subsidies would remain the same under both scenarios. As premiums rise due to
the lower enrollment of relatively healthier individuals without the individual mandate,
the amount the federal government must provide in the form of subsidies increases.
Eibner and Price estimate that new government spending per newly insured individual
would more than double from $3,659 to $7,468 (Eibner and Price 2012, 8). Due to the
lower number of newly insured without the individual mandate, total government
81

spending would only rise by around 2.5% and total health spending by all agents would
decrease by 2.3%.12
Buettgens and Carroll use the Urban Institute’s HIPSM to examine the effect of
eliminating the individual mandate from the ACA as if the reform were fully
implemented in 2011. They model four different scenarios: 1) the current ACA reform
with the individual mandate; 2) the ACA without the individual mandate but with robust
exchange enrollment; 3) the ACA without the mandate with lower preference for
exchange coverage; and 4) the previous scenario with lower subsidy take-up rates. The
different scenarios in Buettgens and Carroll’s analysis represent a range of behaviors in
response to the ACA which are difficult to predict and quantify, yet could have a large
impact on the results of the ACA. The second scenario represents the optimal outcome
without the individual mandate, while the third and fourth scenarios represent possible
shortcomings of the exchanges (in terms of marketing or the web interface, etc.)
(Buettgens and Carroll 2012, 2). In this model, Buettgens and Carroll maintain separate
individual and small group markets (since a majority of states have kept them separate)
and account for anticipated guidance from HHS regarding the affordability exception to
the individual mandate. The latter had the effect of increasing the number of uninsured
relative to the previously cited iteration of HIPSM.
Without the individual mandate, Buettgens and Carroll estimate that the
uninsurance rate would increase from 9.8% to 14.8%, even with robust exchange
enrollment (Buettgens and Carroll 2012, 3). Thus, without the individual mandate, the
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Calculations based on date in Eibner and Price’s 2012 “The Effect of the Affordable Care Act on
Enrollment and Premiums, With and Without the Individual Mandate,” Tables 5 and 6.
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ACA would be less than half as effective at decreasing uninsurance, even in the best case
scenario (Buettgens and Carroll 2012, 3). The additional impact of ineffective outreach,
low exchange preference and low subsidy take-up is relatively small. In the fourth
scenario, for example, the uninsurance rate increases to only 15.7% (Buettgens and
Carroll 2012, 3). Similar to Eibner and Price’s simulation, Buettgens and Carroll find
that insurance coverage through all sources decreases. Compared to the ACA with the
individual mandate, the percentage of the population enrolled in the exchange decreases
by 2% without the mandate and by 5.9% in the fourth scenario with the lowest exchange
enrollment (Buettgens and Carroll 2012, 3). The decrease in exchange enrollment in the
latter scenario is partially mitigated by increased coverage through employers and the
individual market outside of the exchange.
Buettgens and Carroll estimate that premiums inside and outside the exchange
would be different. Due to ACA regulations for plans offered through the exchange,
Buettgens and Carroll must be assuming that different plans would be offered outside the
exchange. In this case, they believe that most of the individuals already purchasing
insurance through the traditional individual market that are ineligible for subsidies would
remain outside the exchange. Buettgens and Carroll also assume that these individuals
would be relatively healthier than the new exchange enrollees, making premiums inside
the exchange 6.1% higher than those outside the exchange with the individual mandate
(Buettgens and Carroll 2012, 6). When the individual mandate is removed but exchange
enrollment is robust, premiums inside the exchange would increase by 10% while
premiums outside the exchange would only increase by 4%. If the individual mandate is
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removed and individuals and businesses have a lower exchange preference and low
subsidy take-up, premiums inside the exchange would rise by 25% (and 14% outside the
exchange) (Buettgens and Carroll 2012, 6). Since initial exchange enrollment may grow
slowly, it may actually resemble Buettgens and Carroll’s third and fourth scenarios.
Given the results of these scenarios, it is not difficult to imagine that exchanges would
suffer from adverse selection in the absence of the individual mandate
Buettgens and Carroll also estimate the effects of the ACA with and without the
individual mandate on government spending. With the individual mandate, the ACA
would decrease the level of uninsurance by 48% relative to current conditions, while
government spending would increase by 34% (Buettgens and Carroll 2012, 5). Without
the individual mandate the level of uninsurance would decrease by only 21% relative to
current conditions, while government spending would increase by 30% (Buettgens and
Carroll 2012, 5). Thus, while eliminating the individual mandate would cut the ACA’s
effect on uninsurance by more than 50%, the level of government spending would only
decrease by 3% to 8%. With the individual mandate, increased government spending is
more effective and affects a larger number of people.
The CBO has also presented brief results from modeling the effects of
implementing the ACA without the individual mandate using HISM for the 2011-2012
period. The CBO estimates that the modified reform would reduce the federal budget
deficit by $252 billion (Congressional Budget Office 2010, 1). This is slightly more than
the CBO estimate for the 2012-2021 period of $210 with the current ACA regulations.
The CBO estimates that eliminating the individual mandate would almost double the
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number of uninsured under the ACA (Congressional Budget Office 2010, 2). Without
the individual mandate, the CBO estimates that insurance coverage among relatively
healthier people would experience a greater decrease than insurance coverage among
relatively less healthy people. Thus, the average enrollee would be less healthy, leading
to adverse selection. The CBO estimates a significant amount of adverse selection which
would increase premiums in the individual markets (inside and outside the exchange) by
15% to 20% (Congressional Budget Office 2010, 2).
Another influential health care researcher, Jonathan Gruber, estimates the effects
of the ACA without the individual mandate using the Gruber Microsimulation Model,
GMSIM. The model relies on multiple data sources to create a synthetic population
representative of the U.S. national population. The data sources include, the 2005 CPS,
MEPS-IC, state regulatory data, TAXISM, BLS data on firms and wages and data on
undocumented immigrants from the Pew Hispanic Center. The GMSIM determines
policy outcomes by simulating the behaviors of firms, which then impact individual
behaviors. As a final step, regulatory actions are then applied after voluntary behaviors
have been modeled. Similar to the CBO’s HISM, the GMSIM estimates individuals’
health care costs using their age, sex and health rating. Firms’ decisions are dependent
on elasticities which are based on empirical literature. Firms’ elasticity of providing
insurance with respect to the net income tax subsidy to the firms’ employees plays a
central role in their decision to offer insurance. These range from -.96 for firms with less
than 200 employees to -.1 for firms with more than 1000 employees (Gruber, 9). A
firm’s decision to offer insurance is a function of the firm’s elasticity of providing
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insurance, in combination with any tax penalties for not offering insurance and expected
expenditures per worker if offering insurance. The GMSIM accounts for changes in the
actuarial value of plans offered, but maintains higher average actuarial values for
employer-sponsored insurance compared to insurance in the individual markets.
Individuals’ decisions to purchase offered insurance is dependent on a healthrelated parameter affecting their health care costs, their elasticity of demand (which
varies by individual), the percent change in the price due to a policy change and their
income. These are then modified to account for other insurance take-up parameters.
Individuals’ elasticity depends on a variety of factors. Uninsured individuals, for
example have an average elasticity of -.5 when facing a 50% reduction in the price of
insurance in the individual market (Gruber, 18). Uninsured individuals who are offered
employer-sponsored insurance have a relatively less elastic demand as they are more
willing to pay large contributions for the offered insurance. Similarly, individuals
already eligible for employer-sponsored insurance also have low price elasticity when
deciding to reenroll with their employer.
Gruber uses the GMSIM to estimate the impact of removing the individual
mandate provision from the ACA in 2019. Like the CBO models described above, the
particular design of the exchanges modeled by Gruber are not explicitly stated, such as
the size employers allowed to participate in the exchange or whether the individual and
small group market are combined. Gruber’s model still offers valuable insights as it
maintains the general provisions of the ACA and undoubtedly represents one of the
exchanges designed by states. Gruber estimates that the number of newly insured
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individuals will decrease by three quarters in the absence of the individual mandate while
premiums in the individual market increase by 27% (Gruber 2011, 2). These estimates
are substantially higher than those of the previous models discussed. This suggests that
the parameters of the GMISM model include higher price elasticities for both firms and
individuals as any initial increase in premiums would result in a larger decrease in
demand which would further increase premiums due to adverse selection. Like the other
models discussed in this section, the GMISM model estimates that eliminating the
individual mandate would decrease coverage by 50% to 75% while only decreasing
government spending by 25% to 30% (Gruber 2011, 2).
It is difficult to believe that the ACA without the individual mandate would be
“successful.” Although “success” is a relative term, most researchers agree that the
effectiveness of the ACA in decreasing uninsurance will be cut by at least half. Perhaps
the ACA would then be half as successful. Moreover, eliminating the individual mandate
would have other adverse effects like increasing premiums in the individual markets
while lower new government spending aids a disproportionately smaller number of
people. Although the results from the models discussed above vary in magnitude, it
seems clear that the individual mandate is an essential part of the ACA. Without the
individual mandate, the implementation of the remaining ACA reforms must be perfect to
achieve the results that approach what they would be otherwise. If people are not
compelled to purchase insurance by financial penalties, it becomes more important that
health insurance exchanges perform optimally by educating and enrolling a large number
of people, especially relatively healthier people, to mitigate adverse selection and create a
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well-functioning market. It seems unlikely that the implementation of the exchanges and
other important reforms such as the risk adjustment program will not encounter any
obstacles. Without the individual mandate to act as a safeguard against these obstacles,
there is more uncertainty regarding the effects of the ACA.

The Single Payer Option
Although states were given a great deal of flexibility in implementing the health
insurance exchanges in the ACA, some states have become interested in a more radical
reform requiring even more flexibility—creating a single payer health care system. In
2011, Vermont passed legislation that would establish its state exchange according to the
ACA, and then transform it into a single payer-system within a few years. The proposal
and model that provided the foundation for the Vermont legislation will be examined in
this section, along with a study prepared by consultants from the Lewin Group for the
state of Maryland in 2000. These models not only provide an interesting contrast to the
previous sections on the ACA with and without the individual mandate, but may become
important if states like Vermont are able to implement them successfully.
In response to a study commissioned by the Vermont legislature in 2010, Hsiao,
Kappel and Gruber recommended a public-private single payer system that they believed
would drastically improve Vermont’s health care landscape. The proposed system was
designed to accomplish six goals: 1) maintain, if not decrease the current level of overall
health spending; 2) include a minimum benefits package that at least covers the average
benefits currently enjoyed by Vermont residents; 3) maximize federal revenues; 4)
88

maintain overall net income for Vermont providers; 5) increase the supply of providers
through “targeted investments”; and 6) implement payment reforms to incentivize the
provision of high quality care and efficiency and eliminate perverse incentives created by
fee-for-service arrangements (Hsiao, Kappel and Gruber 2010, ix).
In this single payer system, Medicaid and Medicare benefits would not change,
but payments for these programs would be made through the same claims administration
process as for the privately insured. The standard benefits package provided to everyone
privately insured would include cost sharing for individuals with family incomes at or
above 200% FPL. Payroll contributions towards health insurance costs would be shared
between employers and employees, but insurance coverage would no longer be offered
through employers. The single payer system would reimburse providers through a
capitation-based payment method. Many of the Vermont state agencies currently
performing similar functions would be responsible for determining eligibility for the
system, collecting payroll contributions, licensing of providers and patient safety
regulation. The independent governing Board of the system, however, would represent
the different actors in the health care system including providers, employers and
consumers and be responsible for determining the benefits package and payment rates.
Hsiao, Kappel and Gruber suggest that the Board contract the claims administration
component to a private company to take advantage of their knowledge and efficiency.
In order to evaluate the effects of their recommendation, Hsiao, Kappel and
Gruber first model the impact of the ACA on Vermont and then model the impact of their
single payer proposal in 2016. They pool three years of CPS data combined with MEPS89

IC data to create a synthetic population reflecting Vermont-specific conditions to perform
their analysis using the GMSIM. In modeling the ACA, they do not specify the specific
characteristics of the Vermont exchange such as merging the small group and individual
markets or the size of employers allowed to participate, but do mention the other main
ACA provisions. In modeling their single payer proposal, Hsiao, Kappel and Gruber
assume that the single payer plan covers all Vermont residents who are U.S. citizens or
documented legal immigrants. These would be part of a single state-wide risk pool.
Their model also includes a standard benefit package that excludes long-term care,
includes limited vision and dental benefits, and requires certain copayments. They
exempt both the employee and employer share of payroll contributions for employees
earning less than 200% FPL (Hsiao, Kappel and Gruber 2010, 137). Hsiao, Kappel and
Gruber also use the Regional Macroeconomic Model (REMI) to estimate their effects on
Vermont’s economy. Due to the scope of this paper, this model is not explained in detail,
but it attempts to account for additional factors such as investments in primary and
preventive care education, incentives towards the provision of primary and preventive
care and towards healthy lifestyle choices.
Hsiao, Kappel and Gruber estimate that the ACA would decrease the uninsurance
rate in Vermont by around 40%, leaving approximately 31,000 uninsured in 2016. 13
Under the single payer system, all legal residents would be automatically enrolled in the
standard benefits package. The only remaining uninsured would be undocumented
immigrants and new Vermont residents who could not yet prove their residency status.

13

Calculation based on data in Hsiao, Kappel and Gruber’s 2010 “Act 128: Health System Reform Design.
Achieving Affordable Universal Health Care in Vermont,” page 78.
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To calculate the impact on total health care spending, they assume that the various
incentives in the ACA will result in health care payment and delivery reforms. Those
reforms, in conjunction with the health insurance exchange and other ACA reforms,
would actually decrease health expenditures by up to $60 million (Hsiao, Kappel and
Gruber 2010, 79). Total health expenditures under their single payer proposal are
projected to be $770 million lower than expenditures under the ACA, or $5.7 billion
(Hsiao, Kappel and Gruber 2010, 150). The model also projects that total premiums for
employer-sponsored insurance, including both the employer and employee shares, would
reach 13.4% of payroll under the ACA and 12.5% with the single payer proposal (Hsiao,
Kappel and Gruber 2010, 151). Under the ACA, the net costs to households with
incomes over 400% would be $96, much lower than the costs under the single payer
system of $552 (Hsiao, Kappel and Gruber 2010, 82).
Sheils and Haught model a similar single payer program for the state of Maryland.
Their plan would cover all legal residents of the state, including those currently covered
under Medicare, Medicaid, CAMPUS and the FEHB Program (Sheils and Haught 2000,
2). Medicaid beneficiaries, however, would retain any benefits not covered under the
single payer benefits package. Their single payer program would attempt to control costs
by using a gatekeeper model of managed care and establish annual global budgets for
health care services covered through the program. The program would be financed using
existing local and federal funding, a payroll tax, increase taxes on tobacco and alcohol,
and an increase in the state personal income tax (Sheils and Haught 2000, 4). The
financial impact of the single payer program on the federal, state and local governments,
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employers and households is estimated using the Lewin Group Health Benefits
Simulation Model (HBSM). The model uses adjusted data from the Maryland subsample
of the March 1999 CPS, merged with the 1987 National Medical Expenditures Survey
(NMES) to represent Maryland’s projected population in 2001. Health care expenditure
data is based on estimates developed by the Maryland Health Services Cost Review
Commission.
The HBSM uses this data to estimate impacts on the number of employers,
businesses and dependents affected, costs to different agents, and health care utilization.
The largest changes in health care spending would result from increased efficiency in
administrative functions performed by insurers, physician and hospitals and increased
utilization due to increase health insurance coverage. Administrative expenditures in the
system would decrease by $1,085.4 million, with over half of that amount being savings
for insurers. The increase in health care utilization for previously insured and
underinsured individuals would result in additional $675.9 billion in expenditures (Sheils
and Haught 2000, 11). Sheils and Haught estimate the single payer plan would decrease
the projected total health care expenditures of $20,759 million under current regulations
by $345.8 million (Sheils and Haught 2000, 9-10). In their model increases in utilization
due to increased health insurance coverage are more than offset by reductions in
administrative costs and payment reforms. Sheils and Haught estimate that the single
payer program would result in a decrease in total household spending on health care by
$161 million, accounting for decreased premiums and out-of-pocket payments as well as
increase tax payments and lost wages (Sheils and Haught 2000, 31). These decreases in
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household spending accrue mostly to families with incomes under $100,000, which is
above 500% FPL.14
These simulations agree that the single payer model results in substantial
administrative efficiencies as payments throughout the health care system are
standardized and streamlined. These are assumed to outweigh any additional costs from
managing the new system. At the same time, the problem of uninsurance disappears, as
all legal residents are generally included in the system. The financing of these systems,
however, involve substantial cost-shifting between those with higher incomes to those
with lower incomes. Similarly, savings or benefits from the system are enjoyed
disproportionately by those with lower incomes, or the previously uninsured. This
subsidization has been a source of philosophical and moral debate in the U.S. Although it
has historically prevented the implementation of other single payer proposals, the system
implemented in Vermont could alter these perceptions if it is successful.

Existing and Ongoing Implementation Efforts
Implementation of the health benefits exchanges outlined in the ACA has varied
greatly by state. According to the Kaiser Family Foundation, which has been tracking
state progress in implementing the ACA reforms, two states, Louisiana and Arkansas,
have decided against implementing an exchange for their state. Three other states have
plans to establish an exchange, 20 are studying their options and 12 have not taken any
significant actions regarding this aspect of the ACA. The Kaiser Family Foundation
14

Calculation based data from Sheils and Haught’s 2000 “Analysis of the Costs and Impact of Universal
Health Care Models for the State of Maryland: The Single-payer and Multi-payer Models,” page 34, and
the 2001 HHS Poverty Guidelines, assuming that the average household size is 4 people.
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categorizes state exchanges based on two criteria: the source of state activity and the
structure of the exchange. The source of state activity refers to the type of entity the
exchange whether it is a non-profit, a quasi-governmental entity or operated by the state.
The structure of the exchange refers to whether the exchange will operate as an active
purchaser or a clearing house for any qualified health plan. Utah and Massachusetts had
already established an active purchaser and a clearinghouse exchanges, respectively, prior
to the ACA. Of the 12 states that have established their state health insurance exchange
because of ACA, six are active purchasers (Rhode Island, Vermont, California,
Connecticut, District of Columbia, and Oregon), while two (Hawaii and Colorado) are
clearinghouses. Four states (West Virginia, Nevada and Washington) have yet to decide
whether their exchange will be an active purchaser or act only as a clearinghouse for
qualified plans. Most exchanges are quasi-governmental entities or operated by the state.
Only one exchange, Hawaii’s, is a non-profit entity. Appendix A contains a short
summary of the progress of health insurance exchanges established by states as of March
1, 2012.

Implications for Colorado

Colorado’s Existing Insurance Market
Colorado’s insurance market mirrors the U.S. as a whole. Since Colorado has
fared better than other states during the recent economic recession, however, general
insurance levels in the state are higher than for the U.S. population. Compared to the
94

national average for 2010, uninsurance in Colorado was 3% lower, while employmentbased insurance was 3% higher. At the same time, a larger portion of Colorado’s
population, almost 13%, was covered by individual health insurance (Division of
Insurance 2011, 7). In an initial report for the State of Colorado presenting an analysis of
the potential impact of its health insurance exchange, Jonathan Gruber draws a useful
picture of Colorado’s uninsured population. A significant portion of Colorado’s
uninsured population is employed, approximately 60%, around two-thirds of which is
offered and eligible for, employer-sponsored insurance. Approximately 60% of
uninsured individuals have family incomes below 200% FPL, supporting the existence of
a large group of uninsured, working poor. An estimated 12.5% of Colorado’s uninsured
population, however, has a family income greater than 400% FPL. Gruber finds a wide
age distribution among the uninsured, although the most common age group is 25-34 year
olds (Gruber 2012, 7).
Similar to individual markets in other states, Colorado’s individual insurance
market faces less restrictive regulations than the markets for group plans. Insurers may
use experience rating to underwrite health plans. While Colorado’s Division of Insurance
does require that plans cover certain basic benefits, these are fewer in number than for
other markets. Also, Colorado does not require insurers to sell standardized policies in
the market. Colorado does operate subsidized high risk pools with very limited
enrollment for individuals who would otherwise be denied insurance due to pre-existing
conditions. In contrast to the individual market, Colorado’s small group market is the
most heavily regulated market in the state requiring certain benefits, guaranteed
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renewability and modified community rating (2011 Colorado Health Cost Report 2011,
12-13).
Colorado’s insurance markets have also followed the national trend towards
consolidation among insurers. In 2007, the AMA found that the two largest insurers in 6
of the largest Metro areas of Colorado dominated between 50% and 81% of the market
(Competition in health insurance: A comprehensive study of U.S. markets: 2007 update,
8). A report based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau and HHS found that family
health insurance premiums in the private market rose 4.2 times faster than median
earnings between 2000 to 2009 (Costly Coverage: Premiums Outpace Paychecks In
Colorado, 1). Thus, Colorado has not been immune to the trend towards insurer
consolidation and health care cost increases that have affected the country as a whole.
This suggests ample opportunity for ACA reforms and a well-designed exchange to
improve the health insurance markets in Colorado.

The Colorado Health Benefit Exchange
Governor John Hickenlooper signed SB 11-200 into law on June 1, 2011,
establishing the Colorado Health Benefit Exchange as a “nonprofit unincorporated public
entity” (Colorado Senate 2011, SB 11-200). The 12-member Board of Directors
governing the Exchange is responsible for considering and determining the structure of
the Exchange, but does not have the authority to promulgate rules or perform any of the
duties of the state’s Insurance Commissioner. The bipartisan Legislative Health Benefit
Exchange Implementation Review Committee, however, may offer bills or other
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recommendations related to planning or establishing the Exchange to the legislative
council and approve financial and operational plans submitted by the Board.
Colorado’s exchange is explicitly prohibited from soliciting bids or acting as an
active purchaser and will thus function as a clearinghouse for all qualified plans offered
by any insurance carrier authorized to conduct business in the state. The Exchange will
maintain separate individual and small-group markets, although these may be combined
under the Board’s recommendation. The Exchange Board recently voted to limit the
small employer exchange to employers with 50 or fewer employees until 2016 when all
exchanges must accept employers with up to 100 employees (Colorado Health Benefit
Exchange). The Colorado Health Benefit Exchange is expected to become operational in
October 2013.

Impact of Colorado’s Exchange
Colorado is still at the beginning stages of establishing its Exchange and its Board
of Directors has many decisions to make. The initial decision to design the Exchange as
a clearinghouse for any willing plan, suggests that the Exchange may not be as effective
in obtaining premium decreases for its enrollees as it could be as an active purchaser.
Using a variety of data sources, including the Current Population Survey, the Colorado
Household Survey collected through Colorado’s Department of Health Care Policy and
Financing and data from the private insurance market, Gruber models the effects of
Colorado’s Exchange on insurance coverage and premiums in 2016 using the GMSIM
described in detail in previous sections.
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Gruber compares the results of his model, which is based on assumptions of how
the various actors will react to ACA regulations and the Exchange, to a counterfactual
scenario without the reform. He estimates that the number of uninsured individuals
would fall by around 45% with the exchange and finds that the number of enrollees in the
individual market would grow substantially just after the Exchange’s implementation and
continue growing afterwards (Gruber 2012, 9). Gruber’s model also finds that the
majority of newly insured people would have incomes below 400% FPL (receiving
premium subsidies), enroll in Medicaid or enroll in insurance through the small group
exchange because of the small business tax credits. Meanwhile, the Exchange and ACA
reforms would actually result in some previously insured individuals losing insurance,
around 8%, as a result of their employer dropping insurance, or because of premium
increases in either the individual market or for their employer-sponsored insurance. This
suggests that the Exchange will adversely affect a small number of individuals.
Gruber also models the effect of the Exchange on premiums. They account for
the effects of the essential benefits, minimum actuarial value (60%) and minimum loss
ration requirements, the movement of Colorado’s existing high risk pool to the exchange,
increased competition among insurers, and the modified community rating requirements.
They find that average premiums in the individual market would actually rise around
19%, which may be partially mitigated as they will be around 11% more generous on
average. This increase is partly the result of individuals choosing more comprehensive
health plans which are made more affordable by public credits and subsidies.
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Despite the average increase in premiums, Gruber estimates that 70% of current
enrollees in the individual market will benefit from reduced premiums costs, 17% will
not experience any substantial change to their premiums cost, while 6% will experience a
rise in premiums costs of less than 10% and 7% will experience a rise of over 10%.
Overall, the number of people experiencing net benefits from the Exchange and ACA
regulations is more than three times the number of people experiencing net losses
(Gruber 2012, 14-15). Gruber’s analysis and results are logical and consistent with the
general theory relating to health insurance Exchanges. Thus, as long as the individual
mandate provision remains in the ACA, it seems like Colorado’s exchange, despite its
inability to use its market power to bargain with insurers, will result in social benefits that
outweigh social losses, although this will be mostly due to public subsidies assuming
increased costs for many enrollees.

99

CONCLUSION
The question of whether the Health Insurance Exchanges mandated by the ACA
are a panacea or a band-aid seems complex, yet after careful examination, the answer is
simple—they are not. They are intended to correct the many market failures in health
insurance markets and in doing so, increase health insurance coverage and mitigate cost
increases. Theoretical and empirical evidence, and simulations based on this evidence,
suggests that exchanges’ ability to correct market failures, especially adverse selection, is
questionable. Even in the best case scenario, in which the individual mandate maximizes
the potential number of exchange enrollees and the exchanges function optimally,
uninsurance rates are estimated to decrease by just 50%. Although this is a substantial
improvement over current conditions, this does not qualify as the result of a “panacea” as
a number of people will remain uninsured. If the U.S. Supreme court decides that the
individual mandate is severable from the rest of the ACA and strikes that provision, the
reform’s ability to decrease uninsurance rates will be cut in half. In this environment, it
is even more important that exchanges perform well and increase their enrollment to
avoid adverse selection that could render them unsustainable. The remaining state design
options affect enrollment and costs, but the effect of the individual mandate (or lack
thereof) overshadows their effects.
The effectiveness of exchanges is also limited by provisions in the ACA which
maintain and even strengthen the connection between employment and insurance
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coverage like the employer mandate and small business tax credits. Additionally, large
employers with over 100 employees are prohibited from offering coverage from
exchange, and individual and small group markets are allowed to exist outside of the
exchange in most states. This substantially reduces the number of potential enrollees in
the exchanges to less than half the population, which limits the exchanges’ ability to
increase health care coverage. The ACA retains the main components of today’s system,
and only adds the exchanges to cover those who are currently left outside the system,
which act like a band-aid for them. Most researchers project that the level of adverse
selection would increase as the level of exchange enrollment decrease, despite the
implementation of risk adjustment programs. Thus, the exchanges’ ability to increase
coverage is limited to only a portion of those who would otherwise remain uninsured,
mostly because the ACA fails to give it additional capacity by maintaining existing
insurance coverage sources.
An alternate solution that is discussed briefly, a single payer system, completely
removes the need to consider uninsurance since all legal residents are automatically
enrolled in the system. Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that significant
administrative efficiencies can also be achieved in this type of system. Increased
bargaining power would also allow the system to better control costs and implement
payment reforms. With this description it would seem like a single payer system would
be the panacea, yet it is not without its own challenges. The U.S. population has
generally opposes this type of system due to a dislike of the high level of subsidization
from higher income groups to lower income groups, its limited choices for consumers,
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concerns about possible rationing and a fear of government bureaucracy and the
expansion of government powers. Analysis of the single payer system, however, does
indicate that a “panacea” to cure the ailing U.S. health care system would require more
radical changes to the systems’ structure, rather than follow the incrementalist approach
reforms have historically followed that are essentially just another band-aid for the
system.
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APPENDIX A: STATES’ PROGRESS ON HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGE
IMPLEMENTATION
Health Benefits Exchanges Established Prior to the Affordable Care Act
Massachusetts
On April 12, 2006 Governor Mitt Romney signed “An Act Providing Access to
Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care,” a comprehensive reform of the state’s
health care system. The legislation included an individual mandate, requirements that
employers provide a certain level of insurance coverage or face financial penalties, and
established a health care exchange, the Commonwealth Health Connector Authority (the
Connector). The Connector is legally separate from the Commonwealth and is governed
by an 11-member board, four of which are ex-officio members, representing both private
and public stakeholders. (Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector Authority Board).
The Connector is an active purchaser that uses specific criteria to ensure that all plans
offered receive its “Seal of Approval.” The Connector offers insurance through two
programs, Commonwealth Care and Commonwealth Choice. Commonwealth Care
offers three tiers of subsidized health insurance for uninsured individuals (they cannot be
eligible for Medicaid) aged 19 years or older, with family incomes up to 300% FPL.
Commonwealth Choice offers three types of insurance plans to a wider range of
consumers, and catastrophic coverage to young adults. Insurance plans are grouped into
three tiers based on the level of cost-sharing. Businesses with up to 50 employees may
offer insurance through the Commonwealth Choice program. Since the Massachusetts
reforms greatly influenced the federal health care reform, it is not surprising that a legal
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review found that the Connector currently has the authority to perform the functions of a
health insurance exchange as outlined in the ACA. Thus, the state is currently working to
ensure that the Connector and the state’s other health reforms comply with ACA (State
Exchange Profiles: Massachusetts, uploaded February 22, 2012).

Utah
Utah passed several pieces of legislation in 2008 and 2009 that organized efforts
to research health care sector reforms. These culminated in the creation of the Utah
Health Exchange, which began operating in 2010. The Utah Health Exchange is
administered by the Office of Consumer Health Services, which is part of the Governor’s
Office of Economic Development. The existing exchange in Utah acts as an online
clearinghouse, offering any willing plan to small businesses and their employees (Utah
Health Exchange Overview). These small businesses are limited to those with 50 or
fewer employees, including self-employed individuals and their families. While
employers determine the amount they would like to contribute towards their employees’
benefits, employees have a wide variety of choices, using the exchange to compare
various plans and enrolling in their chosen plan electronically. While Utah’s existing
exchange provides a solid basis from which to fulfill the ACA requirements regarding
small-group insurance, it requires significant modifications to fulfill federal regulations
regarding the individual market. The Health System Reform Task Force, which
developed the existing exchange, is currently exploring various options to modify and
enhance the Utah Health Exchange so that it satisfies regulations in the ACA.
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Health Benefits Exchanges Established as a Result of the ACA: State Operated
Active Purchasers
Rhode Island
During the 2011 Rhode Island legislative session, a bill was introduced which
would have established a health benefits exchange. After the legislature failed to pass
this bill, Rhode Island Governor Lincoln Chafee established the Rhode Island Health
Benefits Exchange through Executive Order 11-09 on September 19, 2011. To avoid
legislative involvement, the Executive Order created the state’s exchange as a division
within the Executive Department. The Exchange is governed by a 13-member Board,
which receives guidance from various workgroups representing industry experts and
stakeholders (State Exchange Profiles: Rhode Island, uploaded February 17, 2012).
Although development of the Exchange is still far from completed, the Rhode Island
Exchange will be an active purchaser, contracting with carriers and determining which
insurers are allowed to participate. The Rhode Island Healthcare Reform Commission,
which provides guidance to the Rhode Island Exchange Board, recommended two models
based on the FEHB and the Massachusetts Health Connector for the Rhode Island
exchange to follow (Rhode Island Healthcare Reform Commission 2011).

Vermont
Out of all states, Vermont has proposed the most radical changes in its health
insurance and health care markets. These will begin with the creation of the state’s health
benefits exchange, and culminate in the creation of the first single-payer system in the
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United States. Governor Peter Shumlin passed the landmark bill containing this plan, HB
202, on May 26, 2011. It created a publicly financed program called Green Mountain
Care designed to provide all Vermont residents with comprehensive, affordable and highquality health care while containing health care costs. It also created the state-operated
Vermont Health Benefits Exchange in the Department of Vermont Health Access
(DVHA) to comply with ACA regulations effective in 2014. In 2017, the state plans to
request a waiver from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to transition to
Green Mountain Care which will provide coverage to all its residents. In the meantime
Vermont’s exchange will be administered by DVHA and overseen by the Green
Mountain Care Board, which is responsible for the state’s health care system’s progress
towards the realization of Green Mountain Care (State Exchange Profiles: Vermont,
uploaded February 6, 2012).
The Vermont exchange will selectively contract with health plans, including at
least two private insurers and two multi-state plans, as long as these meet requirements
set by the DVHA Commissioner. Although HB 202 mandates that health insurers charge
the same premium if the same plan is offered both inside and outside the exchange, HB
559, which was introduced in January 2012, would completely ban insurance sales to
individuals and small employers outside of the exchange. The bill also defines small
businesses as those with up to 100 employees and merges the small group and individual
insurance markets. These measures would essentially maximize the exchange’s potential
bargaining power (without including the large group market which will continue to
operate outside of the exchange) against health insurers. A competing bill, SB 208, was
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also introduced which would set the size of small employers to those with 50 or fewer
employees and require that health insurance be available for the individuals and small
groups both inside and outside the exchange.

Health Benefits Exchanges Established as a Result of the ACA: Quasi-governmental
Active Purchaser
California
Former Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed two bills (SB 900 and AB
1602) establishing the California Health Benefit Exchange on September 10, 2010,
making the state the first in the nation to pass legislation to create a health insurance
exchange under ACA. The Exchange was created as an independent public entity within
the state government, and is overseen by a 5-member Board. The Board is currently
collaborating with stakeholders and contracting with consulting firms to develop
minimum requirements for health plans participating in the Exchange. State legislation
requires all carriers participating in the Exchange or operating in the private market to
offer at least one health plan at each of four coverage levels. Additionally, health
insurance carriers may offer catastrophic plans through the exchange only. California is
hoping that these measures will reduce the risk of adverse selection which could threaten
the sustainability of their state exchange.
California’s exchange will draw upon the state’s previous experiences as an active
purchaser for existing programs like its small-business purchasing pool and state
employee purchasing pool, and selectively contract with insurance carriers to “provide
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health coverage choices that offer the optimal combination of choice, value, quality and
service” (State Exchange Profiles: California, uploaded March 26, 2012). Although
California is currently developing two separate exchanges to cater to individual and
small-groups, state legislation allows the Board to reevaluate this structure in 2018.

Connecticut
The Connecticut Health Insurance Exchange was established by SB 921, signed
by Governor Dan Malloy on July 1, 2011. The Exchange is a quasi-governmental
organization, defined as “a body politic and corporate, constituting a public
instrumentality and political subdivision of the state… which shall not be construed to be
a department, institution or agency of the state” (Connecticut Senate 2011, Senate Bill
No.921). The Board is currently comprised of 14 members, although legislation has been
introduced that would add two additional Board members. The Exchange will function
as an active purchaser, using criteria developed by the Board to select plans to offer
through the exchange to ensure that individuals and employers are provided an
“adequate” number and selection of choices. Participating carriers must offer certain,
minimum plan types and charge the same premiums if they offer the same plan outside of
the Exchange. Carriers must also publicly justify premium increases for plans offered
through the Exchange.
The Board’s first set of recommendations for the development of the exchange
was released at the beginning of 2012. The Board’s recommendations include combining
the individual and small group exchanges while maintaining separate risk pools for each
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market, maintaining the definition of a small employer to those with 50 or fewer
employees, rather than accepting the ACA’s larger definition of a small employer, and
implementing a small assessment on premiums to help fund the Exchange (State
Exchange Profiles: Connecticut, uploaded March 15, 2012).

District of Columbia
On January 17, 2012, Mayor Vincent Gray signed Act 19-269, establishing the
District of Columbia Health Benefit Exchange Authority as an “independent authority of
the District government” (State Exchange Profiles: D.C., uploaded March 21, 2012). The
Exchange is governed by an 11-member board which, similar to the Connecticut
exchange board, will act as an active purchaser to ensure that individuals and employers
using the Exchange have an adequate number and selection of choices. Carriers
participating in the Exchange must provide certain, minimum plan types in the individual
and small-group exchanges. The same plan offered outside of the exchange must charge
the same premium as the same plan offered within the exchange. The Health Reform
Implementation Committee, which advises the Exchange Board, continues to meet and is
still formulating its recommendations for the exchange structure, including those
regarding the separation or combination of the individual and small-group markets, risk
pooling, plan requirements, and others.
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Oregon
Governor John Kitzhaber signed SB 99 into law on June 22, 2011, establishing
the Oregon Health Insurance Exchange Corporation. The Corporation is a “public
corporation performing government functions and exercising governmental powers” and
governed by a 9-member board (Oregon House 2011, H.B. 3137). Oregon’s exchange
can act as an active purchaser and limit the number of qualified plans offered through the
exchange as long as the same restrictions are applied to all carriers. The Legislature
recently passed HB 4164, which approved the Corporation’s business plan. Like a
majority of other states, Oregon’s exchange will not combine the individual and smallgroup markets but does ensure that premiums for the same plan outside and inside the
exchange are the same. The small-group market will also function based on a defined
contribution design that will allow employers to set their contribution amount and allow
employees to choose an appropriate plan from those offered through the exchange.
Although no specific methods are outlined, Oregon is researching possible risk
adjustment programs to manage potential adverse selection. The plan also includes the
assessment of an administrative fee on insurance carriers to fund the Exchange after 2014
once its federal grant funding decreases.

Health Benefits Exchanges Established as a Result of the ACA: Non-profit
Clearinghouse
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Hawaii
The Hawaii Health Connector was established in SB 1348, signed by Governor
Neil Abercrombie on July 11, 2011. Unlike most other state exchanges, the Connector is
a non-profit corporation governed by a 15-member board appointed by the Governor with
the consent of the Senate. The Connector will operate as a clearing house for information
on all qualified plans listed or offered through the Connector. The Hawaii Insurance
Commissioner will maintain regulatory jurisdiction over health plans and will determine
whether plans meet federal qualifications, and thus participate in the Connector. The
individual and small-group market (of employers with up to 50 employees) will be served
through two separate programs and with separate risk pools. Insurance carriers offering
plans in the small-group market will be required to also offer plans in the individual
market.
One of Hawaii’s greatest concerns with the implementation of health care reform
is preserving the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act (PPHCA) of 1974. The act created the
only employer mandate in the U.S., which required an exemption from ERISA by thenPresident Nixon. The act requires all employers to provide health insurance for any
permanent employee working at least 20 hours a week for four consecutive weeks in
Hawaii. It required certain employer contributions and limited employee contributions
based on income. The Connector Board has stated its intent to seek waivers from any
federal policies that may conflict with PPHCA (Hawaii Health Connector Interim Board
of Directors Report to the 2012 Legislature, 2011).
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Health Benefits Exchanges Established as a Result of the ACA: Quasi-governmental
Clearinghouse
Colorado
Colorado enacted legislation established a quasi-governmental clearing house in
the spring of 2011. Further details are provided in the main section of this paper.

Other State Exchanges
Washington
Washington Governor Christine Gergoire signed SB 5445 into law on May 11,
2011, establishing the Washington Health Benefit Exchange as a “self-sustaining publicprivate partnership separate and distinct from the state” (State Exchange Profiles:
Washington, uploaded March 15, 2012). It is governed by an 11-member Board that
receives substantial assistance from the Washington Health Care Authority, which
currently operates various public health programs. HB 2319, which clarifies some
features of the Exchange, was just recently passed and signed by the Governor. It
prohibits carriers from offering any catastrophic plans outside of the Exchange. It also
requires that carriers offer qualified individual or small-group plans outside of the
Exchange in order to participate in the Exchange. The legislation also gives the Board
the authority to determine whether benefit packages meet the minimum standards for
qualified health plans, which will be pegged to the largest small group plan in the state.
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Maryland
On April 12, 2011, Governor Martin O’Malley signed SB 182/HB 166, creating
the Maryland Health Benefit Exchange as a “public corporation and independent unit of
state government” (State Exchange Profiles: Maryland, uploaded February 22, 2012).
The Exchange is governed by a 9-member Board whose research into the possible
structure and operation of the Exchange has been included in legislation that was
introduced in December 2011. The legislation would allow any eligible plan to
participate in the Exchange in 2014. After its first year of operation, the Exchange would
gain the authority to become an active purchaser and engage in competitive bidding and
negotiate with insurance carriers. The individual and small-group markets (employers
with up to 50 employees) would remain separate until 2017, when the Exchange may
decide to combine these markets. In the established legislation, carriers participating in
the Exchange must offer certain plans outside of the exchange and may not charge
different premiums for the same plan inside and outside of the Exchange. The proposed
legislation would also require carriers with revenues over a certain threshold to offer
products through the Exchange.

Nevada
Nevada’s Silver State Health Insurance Exchange was established by SB 440, and
signed by Governor Brian Sandoval on June 16, 2011. The exchange was created as a
quasi-governmental organization governed by a 10-member board. The Board is
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currently researching the structure of their Exchange (State Exchange Profiles: Nevada,
uploaded February 23, 2012).

West Virginia
The West Virginia Health Benefits Exchange was established through SB 408,
and signed by Governor Earl Ray Tomblin on April 5, 2011. The West Virginia
exchange was established as an entity within the Offices of the Insurance Commissioner,
governed by a 10-member board (State Exchange Profiles: West Virginia, uploaded
February 17, 2012). West Virginia is still in the process of appointing board members
and the Office of the Insurance Commissioner is researching the structure and rules for
their Exchange.
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